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研究生: 黃群豪
Huang, Chun-Hao
論文名稱: 反托拉斯法關於聯合行為之研究—以美國法為中心
A Study of Concerted Actions Under Antitrust Law: Focusing on the Law and Regulation of the United States
指導教授: 陳俊仁
Chen, Chun-Jen
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 社會科學院 - 法律學系
Department of Law
論文出版年: 2019
畢業學年度: 107
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 85
中文關鍵詞: 公平交易法卡特爾聯合行為市場市場力量定價行為有意識的平行行為反托拉斯法合理原則附從限制原則快速審查原則
外文關鍵詞: Antitrust law, conspiracy, concerted action, market, market power, commitment, tacit collusion, explicit collusion, cartels, price fixing, consciously parallel behavior, the Rule of Reason, Ancillary Restraints, Quick Look Doctrine
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  • 台灣是美國第11大貿易夥伴,美國則是台灣第2大貿易夥伴,顯見台灣與美國的經貿關係非常重要,然而,台灣在與美國往來的同時,卻常常誤觸美國反托拉斯法的問題,而遭受很大的損失。

    美國的反托拉斯法,目的在避免事業成為卡特爾,妨礙公平競爭,影響消費者的權益,自施行以來,在美國境內已經遏止相當多起違反公平競爭的事件,但它的效力不僅於此,只要從事商業活動關係,就和該法所欲維持的公平競爭法益有關係,然而,我國廠商不論是科技業或是傳統產業,將商品銷售美國時,往往因為不諳美國法令,常有誤觸美國法網的憾事。

    本文因此以美國的反托拉斯法,將其中最為重要的聯合行為(concerted action)企圖作一個較為完整的介紹,並就「合意」(conspiracy),從美國學者與實務判決中整理出一個輪廓,本文會依序討論「合理原則」(the Rule of Reason),「附從限制原則」(Ancillary Restraints),以及「快速審查原則」(Quick Look Doctrine),希望讓後繼的研究者能快速知曉核心內涵。

    同時,本文也會介紹美國法上的「市場」、「市場力量」意義為何,美國法實務上判斷聯合行為是否構成違法,除了依照行為本身是否即具有反競爭本質以外,還會判斷事業在市場上的「市場力量」,是否產生反競爭/限制競爭的效果而定,在許多案例中,例如In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig.和In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig.,美國法院均認為被告的行為,僅反映出寡占市場的特性,並不能據以論斷被告之間存在合意,所以也不違法。

    另外,在加里晚宴(Gary dinners)一案中,美國法院也清楚地表達出聯合行為與有意識的平行行為的不同之處,兩者最大的區別點在於是否基於合意欲達成壟斷市場的目的,而對定價行為採取一致的行動,藉由案例的討論,希望讓行政執法機關和司法機關能夠有援引適用的來源,最後如果能夠對我國的公平交易法提出一些建議,將是我最大的欣慰。

    Trade relations between Taiwan and the U.S. are very important. But while trading with firms in the United States, Taiwanese firms sometimes misunderstand the issues of the US antitrust law and suffer losses.

    The purpose of antitrust law in the U.S. is to prevent firms from becoming cartels effect, simultaneously hindering fair competition and thus affecting the interests of consumers. Since the laws were enacted, there have been many cases in the United States of unfair competition. As long as a firm engages in business activities, its behavior is related to complete and fair competition. However, many manufacturers, including technological or traditional ones, violate antitrust law when selling their products.

    This thesis explores the main meaning of “commitment” of concerted actions in antitrust law. This thesis also discusses the concept of conspiracy. Furthermore, an outline is drawn from American scholars and representative cases. This thesis will discuss “the Rule of Reason,” “Ancillary Restraints,” and “Quick Look Doctrine” sequentially. By the opinions of scholars and the essence of the cases, this thesis may serve as a solid foundation.

    Meanwhile, this thesis covers the meaning of “market” and “market power” as well. In many cases, such as In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig. and In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig., the U.S. courts held that the defendants’ behaviors only reflected the characteristics of the oligopolistic market, and could not be used to verify the agreement between the defendants. Those are not illegal.

    In addition, in the case of Gary Dinners, the U.S. courts clearly expressed the difference between concerted actions and consciously parallel behavior. The most significant difference is whether the conduct based on the purpose of achieving a monopoly market although the firms take pricing behaviors in appearance. Through the discussion of those cases, I hope that the executive and judicial authorities can apply the sources to the practice in Taiwan. Hopefully, this thesis may join the literature of antitrust law and make a contribution to the possible reforms of the law in Taiwan for future studies.

    ABSTRACT i CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Motivation and Purpose of the Research 1 1.2 Methods and Scope 2 1.3 Structure and Limitations 4 CHAPTER 2 CARTEL’S INFLUENCE IN THE MARKET 8 2.1 Cartel's Definition 8 2.2 The Consequences of the Cartel 10 2.3 Types of Cartels 11 2.4 Prevention for Cartels 14 CHAPTER 3 THE THEORETICAL BASE OF THE CONCERTED ACTION…16 3.1 Concerted Action's Definition 16 3.2 Concerted Action's Characterizations 17 3.3 Concerted Action's Effect Under the Antitrust Law 20 3.4 Case Studies 23 3.5 Exceptions and Exemption 25 3.5.1 Abandonment of the Conspiracy 27 3.5.2 Making a Clean Breast to Authorities 29 3.5.3 Withdrawal from the Conspiracy 31 3.5.4 Report the Conspiracy to the Authorities or Announce His Withdrawal to His Co-conspirators 32 3.5.5 Evidence That the Conspiracy Had Dissolved Before the Limitations Period 34 CHAPTER 4 THE INFLUENCE OF MARKET AND MARKET POWER 38 4.1 Market's Definition 38 4.2 Market Power 's Definition 39 4.3 The Situations in the Recent 41 4.4 Circumstantial Evidence and Burden of Proof 43 CHAPTER 5 THE ARTICLE 15 OF FAIR TRADE ACT IN TAIWAN 62 5.1 Legislative Intents 62 5.2 Inadequacies in the Existing Legal System 63 5.3 Possible Reform Proposals from Perspectives of the U.S. Law 64 5.4 Case Studies 67 CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 73 6.1 Conclusions 73 6.2 Suggestions 75

    Books
    1. ABA, PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, AMER BAR ASSN (2010).
    2. CHRISTOPHER L. SAGERS, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: ANTITRUST, ASPEN PUBLISHERS (2011).
    3. DARON ACEMOGLU, DAVID LAIBSON, AND JOHN LIST’S ECONOMICS, PEARSON (2016).
    4. DAVID G. TARR, TRADE POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITION, WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING COMPANY (2017).
    5. ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, AND STEPHEN CALKINS, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL, WEST (5th ed. 2004).
    6. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, AND JEFFREY L. HARRISON’S UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, LEXISNEXIS (6th ed.2014).
    7. ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, AND STEPHEN CALKINS, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL, WEST ACADEMIC PUBLISHING (5th ed. 2004).
    8. JOHN H. BOGART(EDITOR), CIRCUIT CONFLICTS IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (2009).
    9. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, BLACK LETTER OUTLINE ON ANTITRUST, WEST ACADEMIC PUBLISHING (5th ed. 2011).
    10. LEE MCGOWAN, THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION IN EUROPE: EXPLORING THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S CARTEL POLICY, EDWARD ELGAR PUB (2010).
    11. LIAO YINAN, GONGPING JIAOYIFA JHIH SHIHLUN YUSHIH WU DIERCE, YUANJHAO (2015). 廖義男,公平交易法之釋論與實務第二冊,元照,2015年。
    12. LIAO YINAN, GONGPING JIAOYIFA JHIH SHIHLUN YUSHIH WU DISANCE, YUANJHAO (2017). 廖義男,公平交易法之釋論與實務第三冊,元照,2017年。
    13. MICHAEL PARKIN, ECONOMICS, PEARSON (12th ed. 2015).
    14. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, SOUTH-WESTERN CENGATE LEARNING (5th ed. 2015).
    15. PETER Z. GROSSMAN, HOW CARTELS ENDURE AND HOW THEY FAIL: STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL COLLUSION, EDWARD ELGAR PUB (2004).
    16. OECD, FIGHTING HARD-CORE CARTELS: HARM, EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AND LENIENCY PROGRAMMES, OECD PUBLISHING (2002).
    17. ROGER D. BLAIR, AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (2nd ed. 2008).
    18. ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID, AND DIANE P. WOOD’S TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, FOUNDATION PRESS (6th ed. 2010).
    19. WANG DUCUN, FAIR TRADE ACT, WUNAN (3rd ed. 2007). 汪渡村,公平交易法,五南,2007年三版。

    Journals and Theses
    1. A. Michael Ferrill, Leslie Sara Hyman, and Soledad Valenciano, Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 64 SMU L. Rev. 19 (2011).
    2. Hans-Theo Normann and Elaine S. Tan, Effects of Different Cartel Policies: Evidence from the German Power-Cable Industry, 23 Industrial and Corporate Change 1037 (2013).
    3. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority, 45 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW 145 (2005).
    4. LIAO YINAN, Evaluating Method of Market Power About Firms, in GONGPING JIAOYIFA JHIH SHIHLUN YUSHIH WU DISANCE, YUANJHAO (2017). 廖義男,事業市場力量之評估方法,收錄於氏著「公平交易法之釋論與實務第三冊」,元照,2017年。
    5.Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow, Studies of Cartel Stability: A Comparison of Methodological Approaches, in HOW CARTELS ENDURE AND HOW THEY FAIL: STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL COLLUSION (PETER Z. GROSSMAN, ED. 2004).
    6. Rob van der Nolla and Barbara Baarsma, Compliance With Cartel Laws and the Determinants of Deterrence – An Empirical Investigation, 13 European Competition Journal 336 (2017).
    7. Roger D. Blair and Wenche Wang, The NCAA Cartel and Antitrust Policy, 52 Review of Industrial Organization 351 (2017).
    8. Sebastian Peyer, Cartel Members Only—Revisiting Private Antitrust Policy in Europe, 60 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 627 (2011).
    9. Vivek Ghosal and D. Daniel Sokol, Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions, 48 Review of Industrial Organization 405 (2016).
    10. William H. Page, Objective and Subjective Theories of Concerted Action, 79 Antitrust Law Journal 215 (2014).
    11. William H. Page, The Gary Dinners and the Meaning of Concerted Action, 62 SMU L. Rev. 597 (2009).

    Cases
    1. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
    2. Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
    3. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
    4. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
    5. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979)
    6. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
    7. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
    8. Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2006).
    9. Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., No. CIV-02-0528-HE, 2008 WL 5205204 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 11, 2008).
    10. City of Moundridge v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D.D.C. 2006),
    11. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998).
    12. Consol. Metal Prod., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988).
    13. Cosmetic Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46 (3d Cir. 2007).
    14. Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1477 (9th Cir. 1986).
    15. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
    16. Eastman Kodak Co. of New York v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
    17. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
    18. First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
    19. Fragale & Sons Beverage Co. v. Dill, 760 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1985).
    20. F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
    21. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
    22. InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2003).
    23. In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999).
    24. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997).
    25. In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 908 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
    26. In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1999).
    27. In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
    28. In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
    29. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004).
    30. In re Hawaiian & Guamanian Cabotage Antitrust Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (W.D. Wash. 2009).
    31. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).
    32. In re Parcel Tanker Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 541 F. Supp. 2d 487 (D. Conn. 2008).
    33. In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
    34. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
    35. In re Travel Agent Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 909 (6th Cir. 2009).
    36. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
    37. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
    38. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., 201 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 1999).
    39. Miles Distributors, Inc. v. Specialty Const. Brands, Inc., 476 F.3d 442 (7th Cir. 2007).
    40. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
    41. Morton's Mkt., Inc. v. Gustafson's Dairy, Inc., 198 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 1999).
    42. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
    43. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
    44. Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993).
    45. RDK Truck Sales & Serv. Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., No. CIV.A. 04-4007, 2009 WL 1441578 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2009).
    46. Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995 (6th Cir. 1999).
    46. Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1991).
    48. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
    49. Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010).
    50. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
    51. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001).
    52. Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1991).
    53. United States v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09-CR-0110 SI, 2012 WL 2120452, (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2012).
    54. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
    55. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 76 S. Ct. 994, 100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956).
    56. United States v. Gonzalez, 797 F.2d 915, 916 (10th Cir.1986).
    57. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 62 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Mass. 1999).
    58. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
    59. United States v. Taubman, 297 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2002).
    60. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
    61. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
    62. Viazis v. Am. Ass'n of Orthodontists, 314 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 2002).
    63. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
    64. Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan 102 pan 251. [最高行政法院102判251].
    65. Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan 103 pan 195. [最高行政法院103判195].
    66. Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan 103 pan 294. [最高行政法院103判294].

    Websites
    1. Anti-unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, available at:
    http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?LookType=3&Lib=law&Cgid=6359&Id=30402&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=&paycode=.
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    3. BusinessDictionary, Marginal Cost, available at:
    http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/marginal-cost.html.
    4. Chensinrong, In the United States antitrust case Tevesi pleaded guilty, available at:
    http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20131215000028-260202.
    5. Europa, Antitrust Overview, available at:
    http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html.
    6. Japanese Law Translation, available at:
    http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1929&vm=&re=.
    7. Panjhihyi, Ttrade War Between US and China, available at: https://www.cna.com.tw/news/afe/201804060022.aspx.

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