本研究對尋求較低代理成本具有重要意涵，Seetharaman et al.（2001）為首位提出探討稅率對資本結構決策（例如：舉債水準）和誘因相容契約（incentive compatible contract）（例如：管理者股權水準）間權衡關係，以產生最適管理結構之影響。Jensen and Warner（1988）亦發現即使管理者股權對公司控制代理成本是重要的，但管理者股權決定因素仍不十分清楚，且公司特性和管理者股權間相互關係也需進一步探討。

故本研究以Seetharaman et al.（2001）為基礎，在政策制訂層面加入稅率要素，並依國內外公司特性差異調整變數，且以國內上市公司為樣本，以瞭解較高之邊際稅率對管理者股權和舉債方面是否有反面影響，即稅率增加，公司是否會更傾向於增加負債，降低管理者股權。

除此之外，亦考量國內現況，加入兩稅合一制影響性變數，探討兩稅合一制前後之負向關係，及兩稅合一制後，高低邊際稅率公司其管理者股權與負債比率負向關係是否有所變化。以盼上市公司能藉由此假設所得出之實證結果，依其管理者股權結構，做出相關配套措施（適當的績效考核或獎勵計畫等），使管理當局與股東的利益相結合，避免其做出不力於股東權益的決策。

本文實證結果彙總如下：（1）管理者股權與負債間存在重大顯著負向關係，亦即當管理者股權增加時，其負債比率將會成反向變動，即負債比率將下降，反之則然。（2）高邊際稅率公司，其管理者股權和負債水準間負向關係，小於低邊際稅率公司。（3）兩稅合一制後，管理者股權和負債比率間負向關係將會削弱。（4）實施兩稅合一制度後，高邊際稅率公司，其管理者股權和負債水準間負向關係，小於低邊際稅率公司。實證結果皆與假說相符，故推論成立。

關鍵字：管理者股權、負債比率、邊際稅率、兩稅合一、代理成本

Our research has an important meaning towards looking for the lower agency cost. Seetharaman et al. (2001) was the pioneer who brought up the relationship the tax rate will develop on capital structure (like company’s debt level) and incentive compatible contract (like managerial ownership). Jensen and Warner (1988) also found that managerial ownership plays a key role in agent cost controlling , but determinants of managerial ownership remain obscure, and the interactions between different companies and managerial ownership also need further study.

Based on Seetharaman et al. (2001), this article joins the tax rate factor in policy making decision, adjusting some variables according to the characteristics of domestic and foreign companies, and takes domestic listed companies as examples. We try to understand whether the higher marginal tax rate has negative effects on managerial ownership and company’s debt level. That is, we will see if the company tends to increase its debt and decrease managerial ownership when tax rate rises.

In addition, we take the integration of business income tax and individual income tax into consideration, in accordance with our domestic circumstances. We examine the negative relation between managerial ownership and firm’s debt ratio after the integration of individual and corporate income taxes. We further study how the Tax integration affects the negative relation between higher marginal tax rate companies and lower marginal tax rate companies. With these empirical results, we hope the listed companies take some measures to coordinate the benefits of managers and shareholders, avoiding decisions against shareholders’interests.

The empirical results are summarized as follows: (1) managerial ownership are negatively related to firm’s debt with significance. That is, as the managers own more share of a company, the debt-ratio of the company will decline, and vice versa. (2)The negative relation in higher marginal tax rate companies are more significant than lower marginal tax rate ones. (3)After the integration of individual and corporate income taxes, this negative relation stated in (1) will be diminished. (4) After the integration of individual and corporate income taxes, our result stated in (2) remains unchanged.

Keywords:
managerial ownership, debt ratio, marginal tax rate, integration of business income tax and individual income tax, agent cost

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