本研究主要目的為分析公司的未來成長機會、高階經理人的選擇權酬傭以及投資風險的接受程度的動態效果，此外，希望能找出公司的高階經理人酬傭策略、投資策略和公司表現間的互動情形。本研究的主要發現有以下三點：1).公司未來的成長機會和高階經理人的選擇權酬傭之間確實存在顯著且同向變動的關聯性，且此效果可延續一年。2).高階經理人的選擇權酬傭對於公司投資風險的接受程度雖然在當期有顯著的正向影響，但長期間效果無法延續。3).公司投資風險的接受程度對於公司的獲利表現的影響效果不僅止於今年，還會延續到下個年度。整體而言，透過使用選擇權酬傭獎勵高階經理人追求持久的獲利，其效果並不顯著。若公司希望長期的獲利表現能夠保持一定的水準，或許需要重新評估選擇權酬傭的遞延效果。

　There are no considerable researches in the past taking the timing issue of compensation plan into account. In this research therefore, the major objective is to analyze the lagged effect of a firm’s growth opportunity on its stock option incentive awarded to the high-level managers. Besides, how this endogenous compensation strategy will further affect the investment strategy is also examined. The final impact of these two strategies on firm performance will be further investigated. By using the panel data, which can capture both the cross-section and time-series features, there are three major findings in this paper: 1). growth opportunity indeed has a one-year-lagged effect on incentive compensation. 2). investment strategy will be only impacted by the current compensation policy, but not those decided in previous years. 3). growth-opportunity-based compensation strategy and incentive-based investment strategy simultaneously affect firm performance, not only in the current year but also one year later. The final conclusion suggests that incentive compensation may not be able to solve long-term agency-problem, since incentive effect does not extend to the future. To guarantee long-term growth of profit, companies have to adjust their stock option incentive plan. Moreover, when designing compensation programs, the impact of growth opportunity should not be ignored.

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