本研究以2017至2022年間台灣上市櫃電子公司為樣本，採用臺灣經濟新報資料庫（Taiwan Economic Journal, TEJ）與普通最小平方法(OLS)，整合實質選擇權理論（Real Options Theory）與代理成本理論(Agency Cost Theory)，探討成長不確定性對投資延遲、保留盈餘、ΔTOBINSQ及次優投資風險的影響，並比較疫情前（2017-2019年）與後疫情時代（2020-2022年）的差異。結果顯示，股票波動度正向影響Tobins Q，反映高成長不確定性（如AI技術與供應鏈波動）促使公司加速投資，與投資延遲假說不符，但支持Sarkar (2000)的投資觸發理論；落後一期波動度在後疫情時代會降低Tobins Q，實證顯示會加劇投資延遲，支持實質選擇權理論（Dixit & Pindyck, 1994）。保留盈餘對受落後一期波動度正向影響，後疫情時代公司囤積現金動機增強，符合融資順序理論（Myers & Majluf, 1984）。ΔTobins Q受落後一期波動度與管理者挪用負向影響，後疫情時代代理衝突加劇，與Jensen & Meckling (1976)一致。次優投資風險（以流動比率衡量）受不確定性影響有限，利息保障倍數正向影響流動性，後疫情時代管理者挪用加劇次優投資風險。本研究提出動態財務決策框架，豐富成長不確定性文獻，為台灣電子業提供策略參考。

This study uses Taiwan’s listed electronics firms from 2017 to 2022, employing the TEJ database and OLS regression, integrating real option and agency cost theories to examine the impact of growth uncertainty on investment delay, retained earnings, ΔTobinsQ, and suboptimal investment risk, comparing pre-COVID (2017-2019) and post-COVID (2020-2022) periods. Results show that stock volatility positively affects Tobin’s Q, indicating high uncertainty (e.g., AI technology and supply chain fluctuations) accelerates investment, contradicting the investment delay hypothesis but supporting Sarkar’s (2000) trigger theory. Lagged volatility reduces TobinsQ post-COVID, exacerbating investment delay, aligning with real option theory (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Retained earnings are positively influenced by lagged volatility, with stronger hoarding motives post-COVID, consistent with pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984). ΔTobins Q is negatively impacted by lagged volatility and managerial misappropriation, with intensified agency conflicts post-COVID (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Suboptimality investment risk (measured by current ratio) is marginally affected by uncertainty, with interest coverage ratio increasing liquidity and managerial misappropriation amplifying risk post-COVID. This study proposes a dynamic financial decision-making framework, enriching growth uncertainty literature and offering strategic insights for Taiwan’s electronics industry.

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