產品品質一直是供應商與消費者所重視的要點，品質對於企業來說已不只是商譽的保證，更是與同業競爭並期達到永續經營的關鍵因素。過去探討的議題已從單一企業的品質改善逐漸演變成探討整體供應鏈的品質改善，其中探討的多是上游決定品質成本投入並生產，而下游檢測後售出到市場的兩階層供應鏈模式，少有文獻探討銷售到市場的產品品質同時受到上游零件供應商的產品品質與下游製造商的生產(或加工)品質所影響，這樣的情境形成一個供應商與製造商決策會互相衝突的兩階層供應鏈；也少有文獻同時探討供應鏈上下游間的不良品賠償機制與顧客買到不良品時的保固賠償機制；因為其複雜度極高，品質投入與檢測行為在過去的文獻中都被簡化討論，使得探討得到的結果難以貼近現實情況。

本論文擬針對具單一供應商與單一製造商之兩階層供應鏈，考量供應商決定生產品質投入與進料檢測策略、製造商決定進料檢測策略、生產品質投入與出貨檢測策略，並考量供應鏈成員間及供應鏈與顧客間的不良品賠償機制，建構出供應商與製造商的利潤函式，並以賽局理論探討在不同資訊(生產或檢測)揭露程度下，供應商與製造商間的均衡決策行為；也利用參數分析加以探討其他供應鏈行為對供應鏈成員均衡決策的影響，期望經由賽局模式的探討與參數的分析能帶給決策者重要的管理意涵與建議。另外本論文也探討下游製造商因檢驗出不良品向上游供應商要求的賠償制定之合理性，期望能給予上下游之間在制定賠償契約時合理性的參考依據。

This dissertation examines a serial supply chain that consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, each having imperfect production and inspection processes. Both the supplier and the manufacturer invest in quality improvement actions in their production processes to reduce defective items being produced. In addition to quality investment, the supplier engages in outbound inspection before sending the components to the manufacturer, while the manufacturer
engages in inbound inspection when receiving the components from the supplier, as well as outbound inspection before sending final products to customers. We intend to explore managerial insights from the issues considered in this dissertation.

This dissertation investigates the supplier's and the
manufacturer's quality investment and inspection strategies in four noncooperative games with different degrees of information revealed. The first game considers the least information available, in which the supplier determines its quality investment and outbound inspection policy and the manufacturer determines its inbound inspection policy, quality investment, and outbound inspection policy simultaneously. In the second game model, when the manufacturer's inbound sampling rate is common knowledge, we
derive the supplier's and the manufacturer's strategies of quality investments and outbound sampling rates. On the other hand, when the manufacturer has the strategy of inbound inspection policy, we explore how the manufacturer interacts with the supplier with the strategy of quality investment and with the supplier having the strategy of an outbound inspection policy, respectively, in the final two games. A simple procedure was developed for finding the
equilibrium of the first game while the equilibria analytical solutions of the other three games are derived. These four games allow us to explore the influence of the
inspection-related information, on the equilibrium strategies and profits, and the conditions under which both parties' preferences are aligned. We also explore the rationality of the predetermined unit penalty cost under the equilibrium strategies in all games. The numerical analysis reveals that the expected penalty per defective component incurred by the supplier is much smaller than the effect of nonconforming components on the manufacturer's
expected profit per unit in every game. This raises the concern for the manufacturer of establishing the predetermined unit penalty, despite how prudent it might be. Results of two forms of the unit production cost in quality investment are also illustrated in numerical analysis.

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