本文探討了多角化企業的內部資本市場效率、融資和投資策略之間的關係。所謂有效率的內部資本市場意指多角化企業的高層管理者將資源從較差投資機會部門轉移至有豐富投資機會價值部門，且公司面臨融資約束。根據這個定義，內部資本市場效率有兩大優勢。首先，有效率的內部資本市場可解決較差的外部資本市場效率，也減少了投資不足的問題，有效率的內部資本市場，將減少對外部融資的需要。第二，多角化企業將資源分配在有價值的計畫上將可增加多角化企業的價值；由於多角化的公司的價值提升將可增加抵押物的價值，我們可以推斷，內部資本市場效率對多角化公司融資能力將產生正向影響。然而，多元化可能使得高層管理者做出爭取權利的行為，而使得多角化企業低效率的資源分配。我們推斷，內部資本市場的效率和投資策略之間為負相關係。此外，由於共保效果，多角化公司有能力增加其負債額度；然而，為了避免違約風險，債務持有人將限制多角化企業的投資策略。過去文獻研究僅檢驗多角化和融資策略，投資策略之間的關係。然而，他們忽視了多角化的規模未必與內部資本市場效率呈正相關。在本文中，我們嘗試將這三個因素關係構築出來，且我們的研究結果也許可闡明之前文獻對多角化的悖論。我們的結果指出多角化企業具備有效率的內部資本市場，將可以解決投資不足的問題，並增加多角化企業公司價值。由於多角化公司價值提高將增加抵押物的價值，多角化企業能夠增加其債務的能力。

This paper examines the relationship among internal capital market efficiency, financing and, investment strategies in diversified firms. Efficient internal capital market indicates that top managers of diversified firms allocate resource from the segments with poor investment opportunities to the segments with rich valuable investment opportunities but facing financing constraint. According to this definition, internal capital market efficiency comes out two advantages. First, efficient internal capital market can against external capital market inefficient and also reduce underinvestment problem. Efficient internal capital market will reduce the need of external financing. Second, when diversified firms allocate their resources on valuable projects, the value of diversified firms will increase. Since increasing value of diversified firms will increase the collateral value, we infer that internal capital market efficiency will positively affect leverage capacity of diversified firms. However, diversification may allure top managers to do perk-seeking and power grapping activities, diversified firms may inefficiently allocate resources. We infer that there is a negative relationship between internal capital market efficiency and investment strategy. Further, due to coinsurance effect, diversification has ability to extend their debt capacity. However, to avoid default risk, debtholders will limit diversified firms on their investment strategies. Previous literatures only examine the relationship between diversification and financing strategies, investment strategies separately. However, they ignore that scale of diversification may not be positively related to internal capital market efficiency. In this paper, we tries to draw a picture on these three factors, and our findings might also have shed light on the paradoxes of prior literature on diversification. Our finding indicates that diversified firms with efficient internal capital market can solve underinvestment problem and increase firm value of diversified firms. Since increasing value of diversified firms will increase the collateral value, diversified firms are capable to extend their debt capacity.

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