近年來，由於量子資訊科學的發展一日千里，近代密碼學在安全上開始備感威脅。因此，新一代的量子密碼學也就成為現今密碼學家的主要研究方向。遂各密碼學家相繼提出各式各樣的量子密碼學應用協定。例如，量子金鑰分配 (Quantum key distribution) 和量子安全通訊 (Quantum secure communication) …等等。然而，對於各種協定的安全性尚未有一適當的證明方法。在大部分的研究中，均是利用舉例的方式來證明其安全性，但這樣的方式卻往往會忽略一些暗藏的漏洞。
　　不同於傳統密碼學基於計算安全的特性，量子密碼學是植基於量子的物理特性來達到理論安全，所以資訊理論是相當適合用於分析量子密碼協定的安全性。但量子密碼協定中使用的並非是傳統位元，而是量子位元 (Qubit)，因此並不適用於傳統資訊理論。為了解決此問題，物理學家提出針對量子位元的量子資訊理論，用於分析量子位元的資訊量。然而，大部分的量子密碼協定中，除了傳遞量子位元以外，也可能會傳遞傳統位元，且傳統位元與量子位元之間存在著某種關聯，單獨使用任一種資訊理論來分析皆不恰當。故本論文將設計一個可同時考慮量子位元與傳統位元的方法。此外，也針對資訊洩漏 (Information leakage) 與逐位元攻擊 (Bit-by-bit attack) 兩種攻擊方法加以分析，利用此方法足以深掘協定其中潛藏之漏洞。

Recently, due to the development of quantum information science, modern cryptography is threatened. Thus, quantum cryptography, the next generation of cryptography, has become a popular research topic. A variety of quantum cryptography application protocols have been proposed. For example, quantum key distribution (QKD), quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) and others. However, there is no formal method to prove the secu-rity of these quantum cryptographic protocols. Most researchers analyze the security by testing some attacks, but this method ignores some unobvious flaws.
　　In contrast to classical cryptography, quantum cryptography is based on unconditional security (or theoretical security) instead of computational security. Therefore, information theory can be used to prove its theoretical security. However, in the quantum cryptographic protocol, both the quantum bit (qubit) and classical bit are used. Therefore, classical infor-mation theory does not apply to qubits. Also, the relationship between quantum bits and classical bits should be considered. Fortunately, physicists introduced the quantum infor-mation theory to measure the information of qubits. However, there still exists the problem of measuring the dependence of a qubit and a classical bit.
　　For the reason mentioned above, this thesis proposes a method that simultaneously considers both quantum information and classical information. In addition, this thesis ana-lyzes the proposed method using two kinds of attacks, (a) information leakage and (b) bit-by-bit attack. By using this method, it is much easier to identify some unobvious flaws.

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