本文探討企業訴訟類別與管理高層涉案層級之關聯性，並分析不同類型之違規事件是否會影響高階管理者涉案之可能性。本文以 2021 年至 2025 年臺灣上市公司於公開資訊觀測站揭露之重大訊息為研究樣本，採多元迴歸模型進行實證分析，並以「董事長與負責人涉案」及「理級以上中高階經理人涉案」為應變數，進一步檢驗違反證券交易法、違反如其他如勞動基準法、水污染防制法之永續法令、影響財報、會計科目登載不實及行政裁罰等事件類型與管理高層涉案層級之關聯性。實證結果顯示，違反證券交易法與董事長、負責人涉案，以及理級以上中高階經理人涉案皆呈顯著正向關聯，顯示證券交易法違規事件較可能延伸至公司高階管理層之涉案風險。相較之下，違反其他永續法令、影響財報及會計科目登載不實等變數之影響較不穩定，而行政裁罰則與高階管理者涉案呈現顯著負向關聯。整體而言，本研究指出不同類型之企業訴訟事件，對管理高層涉案層級之影響具有差異，其中以證券交易法違規事件之解釋力最為顯著。

This study examines the relationship between types of corporate litigation and the involvement levels of top management, and investigates whether different types of violations are associated with variations in managerial involvement. Using listed Taiwanese firms’ material information disclosures published on the Market Observation Post System from 2021 to 2025, this study employs multiple regression models with two dependent variables: “chairman/legal representative involvement” and “participation of managers and above.” The empirical analysis further examines the association between management involvement and several event categories, including violations of the Securities and Exchange Act, violations of other sustainability-related regulations, impact on financial statements, inaccurate accounting entries, and administrative penalties.
The empirical results show that violations of the Securities and Exchange Act are significantly and positively associated with both chairman/legal representative involvement and middle-to-upper management involvement, indicating that such violations are more likely to extend to top management. In contrast, the effects of violations of other sustainability-related regulations, financial statement impacts, and misstatements in accounting items are less stable, while administrative sanctions are significantly and negatively associated with managerial involvement. Overall, the findings suggest that different types of corporate litigation have different effects on the involvement levels of top management, with Securities and Exchange Act violations providing the strongest explanatory power.

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