本文探討股票薪酬、股票選擇權及盈餘獎金如何共同影響經理人的投資、融資與違約決策。本文建構一個動態結構模型，其中經理人的薪酬由固定薪資、股票薪酬、股票選擇權及盈餘獎金所組成，並由經理人決定企業的投資時點、違約政策及最適資本結構。本文進一步透過數值分析，評估不同現金流量波動度下各項薪酬工具所產生的影響。研究結果顯示，不同薪酬工具會對經理人產生不同的誘因。提高股票薪酬比例會降低投資門檻，促使經理人提前投資，並普遍降低企業槓桿與信用風險。提高盈餘獎金比例同樣會加速投資，且由於利息費用會降低企業盈餘與經理人獎金，因此促使經理人採取較為保守的融資政策，進而降低最適槓桿、違約風險及信用利差。相較之下，由於股票選擇權具有等待價值，提高股票選擇權薪酬比例會使投資門檻上升；此外，其凸性的報酬結構亦會強化風險承擔誘因，因而提高違約門檻、槓桿比率及信用利差。保留所得亦會藉由提高經理人的外部選擇權價值，進而影響企業政策。此外，薪酬工具對槓桿及信用風險的影響會隨現金流量波動度而改變，而各項薪酬工具與代理成本之間則呈現非線性關係。整體而言，研究結果顯示，不應將各種績效型薪酬工具視為具有相同的誘因效果。因此，經理人薪酬的組成對於協調企業的投資政策、資本結構、信用風險及代理成本具有重要意義。

This study examines how stock compensation, stock options, and earnings-based bonuses jointly affect managerial investment, financing, and default decisions. It develops a dynamic structural model in which a manager whose compensation consists of fixed salary, stock ownership, stock options, and earnings-based bonuses determines the firm’s investment timing, default policy, and optimal capital structure. Numerical analysis is used to evaluate the effects of each compensation component under different levels of cash-flow volatility. The results show that different compensation instruments create distinct managerial incentives. Higher stock compensation lowers the investment threshold and encourages earlier investment, while generally reducing leverage and credit risk. Higher earnings-based bonuses also accelerate investment and induce more conservative financing because interest expenses reduce earnings and bonus payments, thereby lowering optimal leverage, default risk, and credit spreads. In contrast, higher stock-option compensation increases the investment threshold because of its waiting value and strengthens risk-taking incentives through its convex payoff structure, resulting in a higher default threshold, leverage ratio, and credit spread. Reservation income also affects corporate policies by increasing the value of the manager’s outside option. Furthermore, the effects of compensation on leverage and credit risk vary with cash-flow volatility, and the relationships between compensation instruments and agency costs are nonlinear. Overall, the findings demonstrate that performance-based compensation instruments should not be treated as having identical incentive effects. The composition of managerial compensation is therefore important for coordinating investment policy, capital structure, credit risk, and agency costs.

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