本研究主要目的為探討經理人持股是否能夠減輕代理問題。藉由分別探討經理人持股(CEO持股)與公司現金持有量、研究發展支出、債券到期日間之關係，探討是否能藉由增加CEO持股以減輕代理問題。研究結果發現CEO持股與公司現金持有量有顯著的負向關係、CEO持股與公司的研究發展支出有顯著的正向關係、CEO持股與公司的長期債券使用量有顯著的負向關係。這些結果皆顯示，藉由增加經理人持股可以使經理人與股東的利益趨於一致，並減輕代理問題。

The objective of this study is to examine whether managerial stock ownership can mitigate the agency problems. Specifically, I investigate the link between managerial stock ownership (CEO’s stock holdings) and three corporate policies, including cash holdings, research and development spending (R&D spending), and debt maturity, I find that there is a significant and negative relationship between CEO’s stock holdings and the firm’s cash holding. Also, I find a significant and positive relationship between CEO’s stock holdings and the firm’s R&D spending. In addition, I document a negative relationship between CEO’s stock holdings and long-term debt. These results suggest that managerial stock ownership can be effective in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders and thus mitigating agency problems.

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