| 研究生: |
莊維婷 Chuang, Wei-Ting |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
公司治理對現金政策的影響: 以NASDAQ高科技公司為例 The Impacts of Corporate Governance on Cash Holding: NASDAQ Technology Firms |
| 指導教授: |
陳嬿如
Chen, Yenn-Ru |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 財務金融研究所 Graduate Institute of Finance |
| 論文出版年: | 2005 |
| 畢業學年度: | 93 |
| 語文別: | 英文 |
| 論文頁數: | 68 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 股權結構 、現金 、創業投資 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Cash holding, Ownership structure, Venture capital |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:161 下載:16 |
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本研究目的在於探討公司經理人使用現金資源的效率與其對公司治理的影響層面,主要是以美國NASDAQ高科技公司作為樣本,這些公司大多擁有較小的公司規模與股權集中結構。
高科技產業具有異於傳統公司的特質,由於高科技公司經理人大多亦是公司的創始人,他們對於所建立的公司有種獨特熱誠,異於一般專業且非創始者的經理人,這對於公司治理的效益是非常值得深入研究的。迴歸分析中顯示,較高經理人股權會帶來較少的現金資源,且若經理人被歸類為公司創始者,對於決定公司現金資源則具有顯著的影響力;此外,高科技公司通常擁有創業投資家(Venture Capitalists)資本,他們通常會透過得董事會席次來影響公司政策,經由分析後發現創業投資家對於現金的效益需視公司經理人影響力而決定。因此,對於高科技公司而言,這些獨有的性質對公司治理具有決定性影響。
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impacts of corporate governance on cash-holding policy. We concentrate the analyses on NASDAQ technology companies with some distinctive features, such as small firm sizes and concentrated-ownership structures.
In high-tech industries, firms own different governance characteristics from traditional ones. Most of these companies are established by founder-CEOs, and financed by venture capitalists (VCs) who usually get involved in the boards. Decision-making is mainly decided by few people, especially insiders. Hence, discretionary control provides managers and powerful directors with privileges to decide cash policy. What are impacts of their governance features on cash resources? The results show that founder-CEOs prefer to maintain large cash holding in order to keep their position more easily. We also find that higher shareholdings of managers cause less cash holding and it could lessen agency problem between managers and shareholders. The effects of VCs on cash reserve depend on the impact of managers. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that characteristics of high-tech companies have crucial effects on corporate cash resources.
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