本論文探討國家建構衝擊的政治取向如何改變一國的制度發展路徑，以及從哪些既有歷史條件出發，仍能到達兼具治理能力且受社會制衡的政府狀態。國家能力的提升能改善安全、行政與公共服務，卻也可能為統治者提供更有力的控制工具。沿用Acemoglu and Robinson（2023）的國家與社會競爭架構，本論文加入一條傳 導機制：繼承的制度與能力會決定衝擊實際偏向哪一方，並影響國家與社會雙方建 立持久能力的效率。本文將「制度可達性」定義為在給定的歷史先驗分配下，最終走向「國家有能力且社會能有效制衡」之初始歷史所占的先驗權重。
在相同的既有歷史下，較偏向國家的衝擊會使能力累積朝國家側傾斜，並削弱社會側的相對累積；然而，這項局部反應不足以直接判定整個包容性吸引盆地如何變動。若盆地拓撲固定，且所有相關邊界一致向內移動，則對任何固定的歷史先驗分配而言，制度可達性都會下降。反之，在弱國家一側，較強的國家能力累積也可能開啟新的包容路徑，同時其他路徑關閉；此時，總效果取決於新增與失去之初始歷史的先驗權重孰大。即使衝擊只持續有限時間，只要衝擊期間累積的能力使一國在環境恢復後落到原本包容盆地之外，也可能留下制度傷痕。因此，本論文區分暫時的衝擊暴露與持久的制度後果，並指出，包容性的國家建構需要公共能力與持久的社會制衡能力共同發展。

State building can improve security, administration, and public services while giving rulers stronger instruments of control. This thesis studies how the political orientation of a capacity building shock changes institutional paths and the inherited conditions from which constrained government remains reachable. Building on the state society contest of Acemoglu and Robinson (2023), the model adds a transmission channel through which inherited institutions and capacities determine the shock's realized political incidence and how efficiently each side builds durable capacity. Insti tutional reachability is the prior weighted mass of histories leading to a capable government constrained by organized society. At a fixed inher ited history, a more state oriented shock tilts local accumulation toward government and away from society, but this local response does not deter mine the movement of the entire inclusive basin. With fixed basin topology and inward movement of every relevant boundary, reachability contracts under any fixed historical prior. On the weak state flank, stronger state accumulation may instead open new routes to inclusion while routes close elsewhere, making the net effect depend on prior weighted gains and losses. A finite duration shock can also leave an institutional scar when accumu lated capacity changes place a polity outside the restored baseline basin after the shock ends. The framework therefore distinguishes temporary ex posure from persistent institutional consequences. Inclusive state building ultimately requires public capacity and durable social constraint to develop together.

Acemoglu, D. (2025). Nobel lecture: Institutions, technology, and prosperity. American Economic Review, 115(6): 1709–1748.
Acemoglu, D., García-Jimeno, C., and Robinson, J. A. (2015). State capacity and economic development: A network approach. American Economic Review, 105(8): 2364–2409.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., and Yared, P. (2008). Income and democracy. American Economic Review, 98(3): 808–842.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2001). A theory of political transitions. American Economic Review, 91(4): 938–963.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Crown Business, New York.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2019). The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies,ㄙand the Fate of Liberty. Penguin Press, New York.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2023). Weak, despotic, or inclusive? How state type emerges from state versus civil society competition. American Political Science Review, 117(2): 407–420.
Besley, T. and Persson, T. (2009). The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics. American Economic Review, 99(4): 1218–1244.
Besley, T. and Persson, T. (2011). Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Blanchard, O. J. and Summers, L. H. (1986). Hysteresis and the European unemploy ment problem. In Fischer, S., editor, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, volume 1, pages 15–78. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Boix, C. (2003). Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Callaway, B. and Sant’Anna, P. H. C. (2021). Difference-in-differences with multiple time periods. Journal of Econometrics, 225(2): 200–230.
Chambru, C., Henry, E., and Marx, B. (2024). The dynamic consequences of state building: Evidence from the French Revolution. American Economic Review, 114(11): 3578–3622.
Chu, C. Y. C., Chang, J.-J., and Lin, C.-C. (2025). Why does AI hinder democratization? Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 122(19): e2423266122.
Colonescu, C. (2026a). Fragility and regime stability in a state–society dynamic model. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 243: 107439.
Colonescu, C. (2026b). State capacity, societal power, and institutional coevolution: Estimating the narrow corridor. SSRN Working Paper 6338540, March 2026. doi:10.2139/ssrn.6338540.
Dickson, B. J. (2016). The Dictator’s Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy for Survival. Oxford University Press, New York.
Dimitrov, M. K. (2023). Dictatorship and Information: Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Communist Europe and China. Oxford University Press, New York.
Dupuis, P. and Nagurney, A. (1993). Dynamical systems and variational inequalities. Annals of Operations Research, 44: 7–42.
Evans, P. B. (1995). Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Garfias, F. (2018). Elite competition and state capacity development: Theory and evidence from post-revolutionary Mexico. American Political Science Review, 112(2): 339–357.
Heilmann, S. and Perry, E. J., editors. (2011). Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China. Harvard University Asia Center, Cambridge, MA.
Khalil, H. K. (2002). Nonlinear Systems. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 3rd edition.
Levi, M. (1988). Of Rule and Revenue. University of California Press, Berkeley.
Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1): 69–105.
Lorentzen, P. (2013). Regularizing rioting: Permitting public protest in an authoritarian regime. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 8(2): 127–158.
Mann, M. (1984). The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results. European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 25(2): 185–213.
Mann, M. (1993). The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Marwell, G. and Oliver, P. (1993). The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro Social Theory. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Menck, P. J., Heitzig, J., Marwan, N., and Kurths, J. (2013). How basin stability complements the linear-stability paradigm. Nature Physics, 9(2): 89–92.
Moore, B. (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Beacon Press, Boston.
Nagurney, A. and Zhang, D. (1996). Projected Dynamical Systems and Variational Inequalities with Applications. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.
Nathan, A. J. (2003). Authoritarian resilience. Journal of Democracy, 14(1): 6–17.
North, D. C. and Weingast, B. R. (1989). Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England. Journal of Economic History, 49(4): 803–832.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Perko, L. (2001). Differential Equations and Dynamical Systems. Springer, New York, 3rd edition.
Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. American Political Science Review, 94(2): 251–267.
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., and Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Qin, B., Strömberg, D., and Wu, Y. (2017). Why does China allow freer social media?Protests versus surveillance and propaganda. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(1): 117–140.
Qin, B., Strömberg, D., and Wu, Y. (2024). Social media and collective action in China. Econometrica, 92(6): 1993–2026.
Roberts, M. E. (2018). Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. H., and Stephens, J. D. (1992). Capitalist Development and Democracy. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Shirk, S. L. (2007). China: Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise. Oxford University Press, New York.
Sun, L. and Abraham, S. (2021). Estimating dynamic treatment effects in event studies with heterogeneous treatment effects. Journal of Econometrics, 225(2): 175–199.
Tilly, C. (1990). Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, MA.
Tilly, C. (1995). Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758–1834. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Truex, R. (2016). Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Tsai, K. S. (2007). Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Viterna, J. (2013). Women in War: The Micro-Processes of Mobilization in El Salvador.Oxford University Press, New York.
Wood, E. J. (2003). Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. Cambridge University Press, New York.