此篇論文主要探討經理人薪酬對併購公司分割行為的影響。自利的經理人較容易進行多角化併購，該併購行為會造成公司價值下降、增加公司的負債。給予經理人薪酬獎勵可有效防止他們從事價值下降的併購行為，也降低了併購後的分割的可能性，因為過多的多角化的併購，會造成公司的營運效率性降低、增加公司財務上的限制，都會增加公司在併購後的分割的可能性。本研究結果顯示，提供給經理人可有效的降低併購後的分割行為，同時我們也發現，給予股票選擇權能更有效降低公司併購後的分割行為。此外，本研究的結果也發現，併購後的公司增加經理人薪酬獎勵可有效地改善分割後的績效。

The self-interested managers are more likely to undertake the value-reducing diversifying acquisitions. The performance of firms after the M&A is worse than before. After M&A, the firms’ performance become poorer and their leverage become higher for firms. One way to alleviate the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders is providing the equity-based compensation. Awarding the equity-based compensation for managers can prevent them from engaging in acquisitions and also reduce the likelihood of divestitures. Because M&A would lead to the poor performance or financial distress, divestitures usually occur after M&A. Our results indicate that equity-based compensation can efficiency decrease the likelihood of post-merger divestitures. We also find that newly granted stock options show stronger effect on the likelihood of post-merger divestitures than managerial shareholdings. In addition, we report that providing managers with the equity-based compensation can efficiency improve the operating performance for post-divest firms and post-merger divest firms.

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