| 研究生: |
林建百 Lin, Jian-Bai |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
定價與競標之整合模式 The Integration Model of Pricing and Bidding |
| 指導教授: |
林正章
Lin, Cheng-Chang |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 交通管理科學系 Department of Transportation and Communication Management Science |
| 論文出版年: | 2015 |
| 畢業學年度: | 103 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 57 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 零擔貨運 、定價 、逆向競標 、風險趨避 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Less-than-truckload, Pricing, Reverse auction, Risk aversion |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:130 下載:0 |
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運輸產業發展出軸輻式網路確實可以透過中繼站提高乘載率,雖然可以減少司機薪水、燃油等變動成本,但由於低成載率仍然使得每單位所分擔到的固定成本仍然相當高,因此發展出軸輻式網路後仍然有乘載率低的問題,此舉將使得路線貨運業者的利潤難以近一步提高,因此如何攬到更多的貨件以減少剩餘空位的情況就變成一個重要的課題。
本研究以路線貨運業者為討論對象,考慮在需求確定的情況下,探討運輸業者當面對提高承載率問題時,透過選擇適當的競標案使業者利潤最大化,探討在原始營運路線發生運送車輛有剩餘空間時,在不增加大型車輛在現有路線上營運的情況下,雖然必須將部分起迄對價格提高,使得部分零擔運輸的貨件量降低,但搭配著在降低零擔貨貨量前所產生的剩餘空間,藉以滿足運輸拍賣的需求,使整體運送貨件量提高,最終提高路線貨運業者的整體利潤,競標與否會受到決策者對於風險態度的影響,在此風險態度為風險趨避,而競標價格的設定會受到為了滿足競標案的需求而調整後的零擔運輸價格影響。
本研究以1個中繼站、4個營業所作為探討,總計12個起迄對,而競標案有四個情境,並且針對此四個情境分別測試,這些競標案的需求分別為至營業所1、營業所2、營業所3、營業所4的需求,藉由風險趨避效用函數可以得到確定性等值收入,當確定性等值和競標案需求量乘積所獲得的確定性等值收入,大於為了滿足競標案需求所必須放棄的收入,此時會參與競標案,否則就不會參與競標案,本研究希望透過研究內容與數值分析結果提供具體建議,以供學術界及業界未來發展使用。
In this study,we choose line-haul operations to discuss , considering the demand is certainty, discussing the improving the loading rate by selecting the appropriate bidding case to maximize profits, to explore the situation when there are some remaining spaces under the original operation routes when there are no additional large vehicles on existing routes ,although we must increase the prices of some OD pairs , which make parts of the LTL freight volume reduce of some OD pairs, to meet the bidding demand with the remaining volumes,improving line-haul operations’ profit ultimately , the decision to bid or not is based on risk attitude, the risk risk attitude in this research is risk aversion, and the bidding price will be affect by the adjusted LTL price to meet the bidding demand.
We use a hub and four centers as discussion,so there will be 12 OD pairs, there are four scenarios of bidding demand,these scenarios are send to four centers respectively,and we will test four scenarios separately.We can get certainty equivalent(CE) income through risk aversion utility function,when the CE income multiple the volume of bidding demand is greater than the abandoned income,then the road freight operators will accept the scenario or they won't.
中文部份:
1.林嵩然,路線貨物運輸業需求不確定性載運規劃問題之研究,國立成功大學交通管理科學研究所碩士論文,民92。
2.劉志遠,路線貨運業貨物整體運輸網路設計之研究,運輸計劃季刊,民88,第535~564頁。
3.楊秉訓,不確定與訊息經濟學,民102,第70~72頁、第83~85頁
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校內:2017-09-11公開