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研究生: 沈浩平
Shen, Hao-Ping
論文名稱: 機構投資人盡職治理之實證研究
An Empirical Study on Stewardship of Institutional Investors
指導教授: 林囿成
Lin, Yu-Chen
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 會計學系
Department of Accountancy
論文出版年: 2021
畢業學年度: 109
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 73
中文關鍵詞: 公司治理盡職治理機構投資人投資績效經營績效資訊揭露
外文關鍵詞: Corporate Governance, Stewardship, Institutional Investor, Investing Performance, Operating Performance, Information Disclosure
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  • 機構投資人因具有大量資金及專業知識,相較一般投資者有更強的影響力,使其於公司治理佔有舉足輕重的地位。經濟合作暨發展組織(OECD)也於2015年的公司治理原則中,新增了機構投資人、證券市場及其他中介機關的章節。為順應公司治理的國際趨勢並提升我國資本市場品質,主管機關於2016年推出了機構投資人盡職治理守則,督促機構投資人應基於客戶和受益人的長期利益善用資金進行投資,同時改善被投資公司的公司治理。為檢驗守則的推動是否符合預期,本文以機構投資人的投資、經營績效和被投資公司的公司治理程度衡量,為機構投資人盡職治理的有效性提供實證證據。
    整體而言,未發現台灣的機構投資人因加入盡職治理的行列,使投資績效和經營績效提升,但在個別產業中有觀察到顯著的影響。簽署守則對銀行業的投資績效有正面影響,但對保險業的經營績效卻是負面的。本文指出機構投資人的盡職治理程度,和被投資公司的公司治理評等呈正相關。最後,本研究發現個別機構投資人的盡職治理程度和持股比例,和被投資公司的經營績效呈現負相關。

    Institutional Investors have a more substantial influence than individuals due to their capital size and knowledge, making them play a pivotal role in corporate governance. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also established a new chapter for institutional investors into the OECD Principle of Corporate Governance during 2015. In order to follow the international trend of corporate governance and improve the quality of Taiwan’s capital market. Taiwan issued The Stewardship Principle for Institutional Investors (“Stewardship”) in 2016. The Stewardship requests institutional investors to invest based on the long-term interests of customers and beneficiaries and to improve the corporate governance of investees at the same time. To assess and provide empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the Stewardship. This study measures the investing and operating performance of institutional investors and the corporate governance of the investee.
    Overall, this study does not find that institutional investors in Taiwan improve their investing and operating performance due to their participation in the Stewardship. On the other hand, this research finds significant evidence in individual industries. Participation in the Stewardship improves banking’s investing performance and reduces the insurance companies’ operating performance. This study also reveals that the degree of compliance to the Stewardship and the corporate governance rating of the investee have a significantly positive correlation. At last, our findings show that the degree of compliance to the Stewardship and shareholding of institutional investors are negatively correlated with the operating performance of the investee.

    摘要 I ABSTRACT II 誌謝 VI 目錄 VII 表目錄 VIII 圖目錄 IX 第壹章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景與動機 1 第二節 研究目的 5 第貳章 文獻探討與假說建立 7 第一節 盡職治理之內涵 7 第二節 機構投資人投資績效與盡職治理 9 第三節 機構投資人投資績效與產業特性 11 第四節 機構投資人經營績效與盡職治理 12 第五節 被投資公司之公司治理品質與盡職治理 13 第參章 研究方法 15 第一節 樣本選取與資料來源 15 第二節 實證模型與變數衡量 16 第肆章 實證結果與分析 22 第一節 敘述性統計量 22 第二節 相關係數分析 26 第三節 實證結果 30 第四節 額外分析 35 第伍章 結論與建議 45 第一節 結論 45 第二節 研究限制及未來研究方向 46 參考文獻 48 附錄 52 盡職治理守則較佳實務遵循名單評比標準 52 盡職治理評分範例 56 變數詳細定義 68 被投資公司樣本重複筆數 69

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