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研究生: 曾俞嘉
Tseng, Yu-Chia
論文名稱: 使用私募資金進行併購的動機研究
The Motives of Using Private Capital for Financing Mergers & Acquisitions
指導教授: 陳嬿如
Chen, Yenn-Ru
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 財務金融研究所
Graduate Institute of Finance
論文出版年: 2011
畢業學年度: 99
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 50
中文關鍵詞: 私募資金併購過度自信經理人短視近利經理人資金限制資訊不對稱
外文關鍵詞: Private placement, M&As, overconfident CEOs, short-horizon managers, financial constraints, information asymmetry
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  • 本研究之主要目的為研究公司在併購時使用私募資金的動機。當市場上存在資訊不對稱,主併公司很難透過公開發行來融資併購所需的資金。私募資金可以減少公開市場投資人與經理人之間的資訊不對稱並進而減少投資不足的問題,所以它可被當作併購時融資的替代工具。本研究發現,股價被低估的公司傾向使用私募股權資金來融資其併購。我們也發現,過度自信的經理人在面臨資金限制時,傾向使用私募資金來支付併購。且短視近利經理人為了短期股價上漲,也傾向使用私募資金來進行併購。然而,當公司面臨資金限制但卻又有著投資機會時,並不會傾向使用私募資金進行併購。

    This paper examines the motivation of firms using private placement to fund mergers and acquisitions. When information asymmetry exists, acquiring firms are difficult to support their acquisitions through public issuances. Because private placement can mitigate the likelihood of under-financing and thus underinvestment due to the information asymmetry between capital market investors and managers, it can be an alternative to finance acquisitions. We find that firms- with undervalued stocks are more likely to finance acquisitions through the private placement of equity. We also find that overconfident CEOs in financially-constrained firms tend to choose private placement to fund acquisitions, and that short-horizon managers may finance acquisitions through private placement. However, firms with financial constraints and high growth opportunities do not tend to finance acquisitions through private placement.

    摘要 I Abstract II 誌謝 III CONTENTS IV TABLE CONTENTS V Chapter 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Research Background and Motivation 1 1.2 Objectives and Major Findings 2 1.3 Importance of the Study 4 1.4 Organization of this Study 5 Chapter 2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 6 2.1 Financing constraints 8 2.2 Overconfident CEO 10 2.3 Short-horizon managers 12 Chapter 3 Methodology and Data 15 3.1 Methodology 15 3.2 Data and Samples 16 3.3 Variable Definition 18 Chapter 4 Empirical Results and Discussion 27 4.1 Statistics of mergers and acquisitions 27 4.2 Analysis the motivations of choosing private placement to fund acquisitions 29 Chapter 5 Conclusions 35 TABLES 37 REFERENCE 48

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