醫療用品的產業供應鏈模式異於傳統供應鏈，其產品特性因原料昂貴且注重產品品質，故在製造方面同時重視產品品質與原料使用率，其中原料使用率為製造商之重點領域。此供應鏈成員間的互動方式為，原始設備製造商( Original Equipment Manufacturer, OEM )自行採買原料，並於合約製造商( Contract Manufacturer, CM )生產完成後再以批發價格購回，其中OEM獲利多寡則由CM之產品品質良率與原料使用率來權衡，而原料使用率則決定於CM自身原料裁切技術。基於上述互動模式，CM之裁切技術類型與產品品質良率對於OEM獲利產生重要的影響，因此OEM必須以CM之裁切技術類型資訊為依據，並藉由誘因合約來觀察CM真實資訊，同時誘使CM選擇提升裁切努力以增加自身與整體供應鏈之獲利。
本研究以上述情況為出發點，架構研究情境為同一市場上存在單一OEM與單一CM且OEM為決策主導者之模型，再利用主僱理論建構誘因合約，並以賽局理論方法求解OEM與CM於資訊對稱下之平衡策略，接著針對資訊不對稱情況下，探討誘因合約之重要性。研究結果顯示OEM在資訊不對稱下需藉由誘因機制獎勵金的設計來取得較高獲利，因此我們求出獎勵金範圍來避免OEM於資訊不對稱的劣勢情況，並以集中式生產量為給予獎勵與否之判斷標準，即不對稱下CM產量大於等於規定產量即可以獎勵批發價賣出額外生產之產品；若CM產量小於規定產量僅能以普通批發價格販售給OEM，藉由此設計的誘因合約內容與獎勵範圍誘使CM接受並自願性揭露其真實類型，進而使雙方利潤提升達成雙贏局面。

This study examines a supply chain that produces medical products. This supply chain consists of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the contract manufacturer (CM). This research discusses the asymmetric information of the CM’s type (Standard-N type and Improved-L type measured by material cutting thickness) and develops three models sequentially. Model I examines the profits of the OEM and the CM without contract under symmetric information in a decentralized setting. Model II maximizes the total profit of the OEM and the CM in a centralized setting. Model III develops an incentive contract under asymmetric information in a decentralized setting.

The numerical analysis found that the cost of the CM’s cutting effort would affect its profit. Moreover, the cutting effort is affected by the standard cutting thickness. Hence the OEM could use an incentive contract to decrease the disadvantage of asymmetric information. Furthermore, the incentive contract is feasible in a bounded interval of the incentive, and there exists an optimal value of the incentive for the OEM. We found that the contract could be beneficial for both the OEM and the CM.

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