本研究從排放權與產品市場之間的關係出發，分析實行排放權制度對於產品市場所造成的可能影響。假定成本結構及技術對稱的雙佔廠商在產品市場中進行Cournot競爭，污染為伴隨生產過成而產生的副產品。本研究發現，若廠商的成本結構對稱，且邊際減量成本為一固定常數，改變排放權在廠商之間的分配並不會對市場之均衡價格及產量造成影響。反之，若廠商的成本結構不對稱，改變排放權在廠商之間的分配將會影響到市場價格及產量，進而影響到廠商及消費者之剩餘。這表示政府可以利用排放權遂行特定的政策目標，亦即透過排放權在廠商間的分配比例影響產品市場的競爭結果及社會福利。
　　
　　排放權在廠商之間的分配比例會影響到廠商在產品市場的相對競爭力。在廠商必須負擔固定成本時甚至會成為影響市場結構的重要因素。研究亦發現，即使採取較寬鬆的污染管制政策，市場當中的廠商未必全部能從中獲益。

　　在對稱廠商成本結構下，使污染管制政策有效之排放權數量僅與廠商之邊際生產成本有關，與廠商間的排放權分配比例以及污染減量技術無關。與Montgomery (1972)相較，本文在較嚴格的生產成本假設下，以雙佔市場結構得到與完全競爭架構相似的結論：政策的有效性並不受到排放權分配的影響。

　　最後，以排放權交易為策略性工具，具有定價能力的領導廠商有能力藉由排放權市場的交易取得產品市場的獨占力。產品是廠的競爭結構將因排放權市場的競爭而受到破壞。

　This thesis explores the relation between permit market and product market and finds the possible influence that the product market causes. Assume that the symmetric duopoly firms engage in Cournot competition in the product market, and pollution is a by-product of the production process. If the cost structure of the duopoly firms is symmetric and have the same constant marginal abatement cost, the equilibrium price and output of the product is not affected allocation of permits. On the contrary, with asymmetric cost structure, the allocation of permits between the duopoly firms determines the equilibrium price and output level, and consequently both consumers’ and producers’ welfare. This implies that the policy maker can utilize emission permits to achieve some specific goals such as some particular product market equilibrium and social welfare.
　
　The allocation of permits changes the firm’s relative competitiveness in the product market. Especially as the firms have fixed cost, the allocation of permits becomes the key factor of determining the market structure. The analysis also shows that not all firms necessarily benefits from a less stringent pollution control standard.
　　
　With symmetric cost, the effectiveness of pollution control policy only regards to the firms’ marginal production cost but neither permits allocation nor abatement technology of the firms. Under some stringent assumptions on production cost and market structure, this analysis yields a result similar to what Montgomery (1972) did under perfect competition market: The effectiveness of the policy is not influenced by permits allocation among firms.

　By strategically setting price, the leading firm of the permit market could buyout its rival(s) and act as a monopolist in the output market. The competitiveness of output market was shattered by the existence of permit trading.

英文部份
Fershtman, C. and A. Zeeuw, “Tradable Emission Permits in Oligopoly,” Tilburg CentER for Economic Research Discussion Paper: 9630, (December 1995).

Friedman, J.W., Game Theory with Application to Economics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1991), pp. 205-216.

Hann, R.W., “Market Power and Transferable Property Rights,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 99, No. 4 (November 1984), pp. 753-765.

Misiolek, W.S. and H.W. Elder, “Exclusionary Manipulation of Markets for Pollution Rights,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 16, No. 2 (March 1989), pp. 156-166.

Montgomery, W.D., “Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs,” Journal of Economic Theory,” Vol. 5, No. 3 (December 1972), pp. 395-418.

Requate, T., “Incentive to innovate under emission taxes and tradeable permits,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 14 (1998), pp.139-165.

Roth, A.E., Axiomatic Models of Bargaining, (New York: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 1st ed., 1979), pp. 1-12.

Sartzatakis, E.S., “Raising Rival's Cost Strategies via Emission Permit Market,” Review of Industrial Organization, 12(1997), pp.751-765.

中文部份
行政院環保署：〈溫室氣體排放〉，《氣候變化綱要公約資訊速報》， 17期（民國八十八年六月），頁4-8。網址：http://sd.erl.itri.org.tw/fccc/nsletter/news17/index17.htm（瀏覽日期：2003年12月）

李堅明：〈我國空氣污染物之排放權交易制度建置〉，行政院環保署（民國八十九年十二月）（EPA-89-FA11-03-150）。

蔡攀龍、陳彧夏：《經濟學數學方法導論（靜態分析）》（台北：茂昌圖書公司，1994年），頁121-125。