簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示

回結果列表
研究生： 楊成
Chinpinkyo, Thitiwat
論文名稱： Corruption and Economic Growth: Preliminary Evidences from East Asian Economics
Corruption and Economic Growth: Preliminary Evidences from East Asian Economics
指導教授： 謝文真
Hsieh, Wen-Jen
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 管理學院 - 國際經營管理研究所碩士班
Institute of International Management (IIMBA--Master)
論文出版年： 2012
畢業學年度： 100
語文別： 英文
論文頁數： 88
外文關鍵詞： Corruption, Economic growth, Grease hypothesis, Sand hypothesis, Government efficiency, East Asian economies
相關次數： 點閱：57  下載：0 
分享至:
查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報

    • The relationship between corruption and the economic growth rate has been discussed for a few recent decades among economists. From reviewing the previous literatures, there are two existed theories, namely the grease and the sand the wheel of development. While the literatures from the sand side have strongly insisted the negative effect of corruption on growth regardless any condition, the grease theory suggests that corruption may foster the economic growth in some particular situations. Basically, this study aims to examine three hypotheses. First of all, this research intends to verify whether or not corruption can be beneficial to the growth for those developing countries while detrimental elsewhere. Second, it aims to validate whether or not corruption can foster economic growth rate for the economy where the government efficiency is relatively low and impede the growth for the otherwise. Lastly, it intends to verify whether or not in the situation where the level of corruption is almost absence, the amount of marginal cost spent for fighting against corruption is larger than the marginal benefit acquired.

    To test these hypotheses, the method of the fixed effects model is implemented. A panel data of Asian economies are mainly drawn from three sources including World Bank, Institution of International Management and Development, and Transparency International. As a consequence, based on the limitation of data, our samples are the 15-year balanced panel data of ten East Asian economies including, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.

    In conclusion, the regression results support two out of three proposals by the grease hypothesis. Particularly, corruption has the positive effect on the economic growth rate in those developing countries. The estimated results suggest that their economic growth rate will be lowered by 1.49 percent when their corruption perception index is improved by one-point scale. Nevertheless, it retards the economic performance in developed countries. The estimated results suggest that those developed countries can advance their economic growth rate by 2.74 percent when their corruption perception index is improved by one-point scale. Additionally, the government efficiency statistically moderates the relationship between corruption and the economic growth rate. In this region, the estimated results suggest that corruption seems to be beneficial to the economic growth rate in the aggregated level. However, this positive effect on the economic growth rate will become weaker by 0.43 as long as the government efficiency is improved by one-point scale. This concurs with the proposal by the grease side that corruption can be considered as the second best method. Subsequently, in order to move towards the economy where the best method is mainly used instead of the second best one, each economy, especially those developing ones, should improve the efficiency of its government. Finally, the results do not suggest the non-linear relationship in between.

    ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I ABSTRACT III TABLE OF CONTENTS V LIST OF TABLES VIII LIST OF FIGURES IX CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Research Background. 1 1.2 Research Motivations and Contributions. 3 1.3 Research Objective. 5 1.4 Research Framework. 5 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 7 2.1 Corruption. 7 2.2 Corruption and Growth. 9 2.2.1 “Grease the Wheel of Development” Hypothesis. 9 2.2.2 “Sand the Wheel of Development” Hypothesis. 15 2.2.3 Government Efficiency. 22 2.3 Hypotheses Development. 23 CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 30 3.1 Hypotheses to be Tested and Model. 30 3.2 Data Description and Collection. 35 3.2.1 Corruption and Government Efficiency Data. 36 3.2.2 Macro Economic Data and Explanatory Variables. 37 3.3 Methods of Analysis. 38 3.3.1 Granger Causality Test. 38 3.3.2 Hypothesis Testing. 38 3.3.3 Testing the Autocorrelation Problem. 39 CHAPTER FOUR EMPIRICAL STUDY 41 4.1 Data Summary. 41 4.2 Test of Granger Causality. 46 4.3 Results of Hypothesis Testing. 47 4.3.1 Results of The First Hypothesis. 47 4.3.2 Results of The Second Hypothesis. 50 4.3.3 Results of The Third Hypothesis. 54 4.4 The Regression Results of the CPI Lagged by One More Period. 58 CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 62 5.1 Research Conclusions and Discussion. 62 5.2 Research Implications and Suggestion. 64 5.3 Research Limitations and Future Research. 65 REFERENCES 68 APPENDICES 72 Appendix 1: Per Capita GDP Growth Rate of East Asian Developed Countries. 72 Appendix 2: Per Capita GDP Growth Rate of East Asian Developing Countries. 73 Appendix 3: Corruption Perception Index of East Asian Developed Countries. 74 Appendix 4: Corruption Perception Index of East Asian Developing Countries. 75 Appendix 5: Per Capita GDP of East Asian Developed Countries. 76 Appendix 6: Per Capita GDP of East Asian Developing Countries. 77 Appendix 7: Gross Fixed Capital Formation as Percentage of GDP of East Asian Developed Countries. 78 Appendix 8: Gross Fixed Capital Formation as Percentage of GDP of East Asian Developing Countries. 79 Appendix 9: Percentage of Increase in Total Labor in Economy of East Asian Developed Countries. 80 Appendix 10: Percentage of Increase in Total Labor in Economy of East Asian Developing Countries. 81 Appendix 11: Trade Openness of GDP of East Asian Developed Countries. 82 Appendix 12: Trade Openness of GDP of East Asian Developing Countries. 83 Appendix 13: Educational System of East Asian Developed Countries. 84 Appendix 14: Educational System of East Asian Developing Countries. 85 Appendix 15: Government Efficiency of East Asian Developed Countries. 86 Appendix 16: Government Efficiency of East Asian Developing Countries. 87 Appendix 17: The Regression Results of Latin Countries. 88

    Acemoglu, D., & Verdier, T. (1998). Property rights, corruption and the allocation of talent: a general equilibrium approach. Economic Journal, 1381-1403.
    Aidt, T., Dutta, J., & Sena, V. (2008). Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence. Journal of Comparative Economics, 36(2), 195-220.
    Aidt, T. S. (2009). Corruption, institutions, and economic growth rate. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 25(2), 271.
    Anoruo, E., & Braha, H. (2005). Corruption and economic growth: the African experience. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 7(1), 43-55.
    Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and development: a review of issues. Journal of Economic Literature, 35(3), 1320-1346.
    Barro, R. J. (1991). Economic growth in a cross section of countries. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2), 407.
    Barro, R. J. (1997). Determinants of economic growth: A cross-country empirical study: National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA.
    Barro, R. J., & Lee, J. W. (1993). International comparisons of educational attainment. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3), 363-394.
    Bayley, D. H. (1966). The effects of corruption in a developing nation. The Western Political Quarterly, 719-732.
    Beck, P. J., & Maher, M. W. (1986). A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets. Economics Letters, 20(1), 1-5.
    Cass, D. (1965). Optimum growth in an aggregative model of capital accumulation. The Review of Economic Studies, 233-240.
    Chen, B., & Feng, Y. (2000). Determinants of economic growth in China: Private enterprise, education, and openness. China Economic Review, 11(1), 1-15.
    De Soto, H. (1990). The other path: The invisible revolution in the Third World.
    Dreher, A., & Schneider, F. (2010). Corruption and the shadow economy: An empirical analysis. Public Choice, 144(1), 215-238.
    Edgardo Campos Donald, J. (1999). The impact of corruption on investment: Predictability matters. World Development, 27(6), 1059-1067.
    Egger, P., & Winner, H. (2005). Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment. European journal of political economy, 21(4), 932-952.
    Ehrlich, I., & Lui, F. T. (1999). Bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth. Journal of Political Economy, 107(S6), 270-293.
    Fisman, R., & Svensson, J. (2007). Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 83(1), 63-75.
    Friedrich, C. J. (1972). The Pathology of Politics: violence, betrayal, corruption, secrecy, and propaganda: Harper & Row New York.
    Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty? Economics of Governance, 3(1), 23-45.
    Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, 12.
    Kaufmann, D., & Wei, S. J. (1999). Does" grease money" speed up the wheels of commerce? : National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA.
    Klitgaard, R. E., & Klitgaard, R. (1991). Controlling corruption: Univ of California Pr.
    Kormendi, R. C., & Meguire, P. G. (1985). Macroeconomic determinants of growth: Cross-country evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics, 16(2), 141-163.
    Kurer, O. (1993). Clientelism, corruption, and the allocation of resources. Public Choice, 77(2), 259-273.
    Lambsdorff, J. G. (2003a). How corruption affects persistent capital flows. Economics of Governance, 4(3), 229-243.
    Lambsdorff, J. G. (2003b). How corruption affects productivity. Kyklos, 56(4), 457-474.
    Leff, N. H. (1964). Economic growth rate through bureaucratic corruption. American Behavioral Scientist, 8(3), 8.
    Levine, R., & Renelt, D. (1992). A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions. The American Economic Review, 942-963.
    Levy, D. (2007). Price adjustment under the table: Evidence on efficiency-enhancing corruption. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(2), 423-447.
    Leys, C. (1965). What is the problem about corruption? Journal of Modern African Studies, 3(2), 215-224.
    Li, H., Xu, L. C., & Zou, H. (2000). Corruption, income distribution, and growth. Economics & Politics, 12(2), 155-182.
    Lien, D. D. (1986). A note on competitive bribery games. Economics Letters, 22(4), 337-341.
    Lui, F. T. (1985). An equilibrium queuing model of bribery. The Journal of Political Economy, 93(4), 760-781.
    Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D., & Weil, D. N. (1992). A contribution to the empirics of economic growth. The quarterly journal of economics, 107(2), 407.
    Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3), 681.
    Mauro, P. (1998). Corruption and the composition of government expenditure. Journal of Public Economics, 69(2), 263-279.
    Méndez, F., & Sepulveda, F. (2006). Corruption, growth and political regimes: Cross country evidence. European Journal of Political Economy, 22(1), 82-98.
    Méon, P. G., & Sekkat, K. (2005). Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth? Public Choice, 122(1), 69-97.
    Méon, P. G., & Weill, L. (2010). Is corruption an efficient grease? World Development, 38(3), 244-259.
    Mo, P. H. (2001). Corruption and Economic Growth. Journal of Comparative Economics, 29(1), 66-79.
    Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993). Why is rent-seeking so costly to growth? The American Economic Review, 83(2), 409-414.
    Myrdal, G. (1968). Asian drama, an inquiry into the poverty of nations. Asian drama, an inquiry into the poverty of nations.
    Nye, J. S. (1967). Corruption and political development: a cost-benefit analysis. The American Political Science Review, 61(2), 417-427.
    Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political Science Review, 567-576.
    Ramsey, F. P. (1928). A mathematical theory of saving. The Economic Journal, 38(152), 543-559.
    Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2004). Local Capture: Evidence From a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2), 679-705.
    Rock, M. T., & Bonnett, H. (2004). The comparative politics of corruption: Accounting for the East Asian paradox in empirical studies of corruption, growth and investment. World Development, 32(6), 999-1017.
    Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997). The political economy of corruption. Corruption and the global economy, 31-60.
    Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993). Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), 599-617.
    Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1), 65.
    Vial, V., & Hanoteau, J. (2010). Corruption, manufacturing plant growth, and the Asian paradox: Indonesian evidence. World Development, 38(5), 693-705.
    Wei, S. J., & Shleifer, A. (2000). Local corruption and global capital flows. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 303-346.

    QR CODE