本研究探討CEO婚姻狀態是否影響企業在營運逆風情境下之成本調整決策，特別聚焦於人力相關成本之調整行為。考量人力成本通常伴隨高度調整摩擦，且既有研究對管理者個人特質如何影響此類決策之實證證據仍有限，本文從管理者生命歷程特徵出發，分析婚姻狀態所隱含的風險態度與職涯考量，是否會在銷貨收入下降時改變企業成本調整的即時性。本文以美國S&P500公司1993年至2008年之公司年資料為研究樣本。實證結果顯示，在整體樣本中，已婚CEO於銷售下滑期間呈現較低程度之成本僵固性，顯示其成本調整反應相對較為即時；進一步的測試發現，該效果僅在員工密度較高之企業中顯著存在，提供與人力相關成本調整決策間接的證據。此外，補充性的橫斷面分析顯示，上述關係在盈餘衰退情境與已婚CEO任期較長之樣本中較為明顯。整體而言，本文提供證據顯示，已婚CEO在營運逆風期間，較可能啟動涉及人力相關之成本調整行為，深化了對管理者個人特質如何影響企業成本調整決策的瞭解。

This study examines whether CEO marital status affects firms’ cost adjustment behavior during periods of adverse operating conditions, with particular emphasis on labor-related cost adjustments. Because labor costs typically involve high adjustment frictions and implicit organizational costs, managers may respond asymmetrically to revenue increases and decreases. From a managerial life-cycle perspective, CEO marital status may embed systematic differences in risk attitudes and career concerns, which in turn influence the timeliness of cost reductions when sales decline. Using a two-stage indirect validation strategy, this study first employs selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses as an observable proxy for internal cost adjustment behavior within the cost stickiness framework, and then examines whether the effect concentrates in settings where labor-related components are more economically important.
Using a sample of non-financial S&P 500 firms from 1993 to 2008, the empirical results indicate that firms led by married CEOs exhibit a lower degree of cost stickiness during sales decline periods, suggesting relatively more timely cost reductions. Further analyses show that this effect is statistically significant only among firms with higher employee intensity, providing indirect evidence consistent with labor-related cost adjustment mechanisms. Additional cross-sectional tests reveal that the effect is more pronounced during earnings deterioration periods and when married CEOs have longer tenure, implying that performance pressure and decision influence amplify the translation of managerial traits into realized cost adjustment outcomes.

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