近幾年來國外許多知名企業皆發生經營上的危機，探究原因之ㄧ為其實施員工股票選擇權制度(ESOP)，且在許多文獻上也證實了員工股票選擇權制度會趨使公司管理者為求自身財富的極大，而採行較具風險性的經營行為。在我們台灣，目前員工股票選擇權制度實施期間不長，主要還是以員工股票分紅為主，因此本研究即以此方向去探討我國的員工股票分紅制度對於公司投資風險與融資風險的影響。
本研究以國內上市上櫃之電子資訊產業為研究對象，利用1993年到2002年各樣本公司之員工股票分紅及財務資料，以研究發展費用作為高風險性投資之代理變數，資本支出及公司之總投資作為公司在低風險性投資上的代理變數；以公司之槓桿為融資風險的代理變數，及以股票報酬的變動作為公司總營運風險的代理變數，探討員工股票分紅制度是否會影響公司之代理機制，使公司經營之利害關係人目標一致，進而降低其營運上的風險。
研究結果顯示，公司實施員工股票分紅制度確實會降低公司之投資風險與融資風險。在投資風險方面，本研究發現研究發展支出與員工股票分紅有顯著反向關係，與資本資出和公司總投資有顯著正向關係。在融資風險方面，研究結果發現公司之槓桿與員工股票分紅有顯著反向關係。最後在公司總營運風險方面，其結果顯示亦為反向關係，但此部分關係並不顯著。

To examine the impact of the magnitude of employee bonus shares on firm’s investment risk and financing risk, about 1061 electronic and information firms whose stocks are traded in markets of TSE or OTC are selected to make up the sample.
The employee bonus shares in Taiwan is special compensation system. In this way, firms usually give employee bonus in common stocks instead of cash bonus, and this kind of compensation system is different form the employee stock option system in U.S.A. In the study, I have found that firms tend to grant more employee bonus shares when they have more growth opportunities or face financial constraints. Besides, firms whose scales are larger tend to grant more employee bonus shares.
Empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that there is a significance relation between the employee bonus shares and firm’s investment policy or financing policy. Higher employee bonus shares is negatively related to firm’s high risk investment policy, but positively related to firm’s low risk investment policy. Also, I find that higher employee bonus shares are negatively related to firm’s debt policy. That is to say, firms with higher employee bonus shares would reduce the investment risk and financing risk.

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