本研究探討審計委員會獨立董事薪酬與審計公費、非審計公費之關聯性-以台灣上市上櫃公司為研究樣本。實證結果發現審計委員會獨立董事薪酬愈高，公司的審計公費有愈高的現象，推估當獨立董事薪酬愈高時，獨立董事所需承擔的風險愈高並在考量自身聲譽下，監控上也會較為嚴謹，因此會要求更好的審計品質及服務，進而增加審計服務與公費。應變數為非審計公費之實證結果則為不顯著，代表沒有證據支持此一關聯性。

This study examines the association between the audit committee independent directors’ compensations and audit/non-audit fees. After controlling the fixed effect of industry, we find that the higher the independent director compensations, the higher the audit fees.

When there are higher compensations of an independent director, the higher risk that the independent director will face and in turn he/she will be more rigorous in monitoring audit quality, therefore will require more audit services, and increase the audit fees, as a consequence. The empirical results for non-audit fees are insignificant and represent that there is no association between audit committee independent directors’ compensations and non-audit fees.

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蔡慧玲，1998，企業對會計師事務所非審計服務之需求研究，國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
林松樹，2002，大陸台商對非審計服務需求之研究，國立台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文。

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