本研究旨在探討通才型CEO對投資不效率的影響。基於高層理論，CEO的個人特質顯著影響企業決策的方向，而本研究主張通才型CEO具備不同領域的工作經驗，使其擁有豐富的專業知識及判斷力，能更準確的評估市場環境及潛在機會，做出最適切的投資決策。因此，本研究預期通才型CEO與投資不效率現象存在負相關。本研究以1998至2007年美國標準普爾1500的企業為樣本進行實證測試。實證結果顯示，通才型CEO有效地降低投資不效率的情形，後續測試的結果更進一步說明，其效果來自通才型CEO有效地抑制過度投資的現象。同時，橫斷面分析結果亦指出，在高成長機會企業中，通才型CEO改善投資不效率的效果更為明顯。本研究拓展了投資效率及通才型CEO的相關研究，並對高層管理者的任用與投資決策的評估具備實務意涵。

This study aims to examine the impact of generalist CEOs on investment inefficiency. Based on Upper Echelons Theory, the personal traits of CEOs significantly influence the direction of corporate decision-making. This research argues that generalist CEOs possess work experience across diverse fields, which equips them with broad professional knowledge and sound judgment, enabling them to more accurately assess market conditions and potential opportunities, and thereby make more appropriate investment decisions. Accordingly, this study anticipates a negative correlation between generalist CEOs and investment inefficiency. Using a sample of firms from the S&P 1500 index between 1998 and 2007, this study conducts empirical tests to evaluate this relationship. The results indicate that generalist CEOs effectively reduce investment inefficiency. Further analyses reveal that this effect primarily stems from the generalist CEOs’ ability to curb overinvestment. In addition, cross-sectional analysis shows that the improvement in investment efficiency is more pronounced in firms with high growth opportunities. This study contributes to the literature on investment efficiency and generalist CEOs, and offers practical implications for executive hiring and investment decision-making.

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