本研究之目的主要在探討，高現金持有之公司是否較容易參與併購案，並進行損害公司價值的併購行為。高現金持有的公司擁有較高的市價帳面價值比及較低的負債比率，意味高現金持有的公司具有有較多的投資機會、較高的投資不確定性及較少舉債的特性，本研究發現高現金持有的公司較容易成為併購案中的買方，也因持有較多現金而不會有投資不足的問題產生。本研究的結果併購中的買方並無異常報酬，顯示管理人的併購行為並不會損害股東的利益。

This paper examines whether cash-rich firms are more likely to engage in acquisitions and value-decreasing acquisitions. I find that cash-rich firms have a higher market-to-book ratio and a lower leverage ratio, implying that they have more investment opportunities, higher level of uncertainty in investments, and less possibility to raise debt. I find that cash-rich firms are more likely to become bidders in acquisitions than other firms and experience less underinvestment problem. My evidence also shows insignificant bidder returns, indicating that the acquisition decisions made by managers do not harm stockholders.

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