目前在討論併購的文獻中，有關未來報酬的折現均是以指數函數貼現，該假設隱含著市場參與者的時間偏好是一致的，並不會隨著時間而有所改變，但在真實的市場中，此假設是不切實際的，參與者對未來報酬的偏好是會隨著時間而改變的。本文探討在公司管理者具有時間偏好不一致下的最適併購策略，併購模型是以Lambrecht( 2004)的模型為基礎，公司管理者偏好則以準雙曲貼現函數描述，基於公司管理者對自己偏好的認知，分別考慮成熟型和幼稚型公司管理者的最適併購策略。首先，引用Lambrecht( 2004)的模型求得具有時間偏好一致管理者的企業其最適併購門檻值及併購選擇權價值的一般式，接著，將準雙曲貼現模型導入Lambrecht( 2004)的模型，並求得公司管理者為成熟型和幼稚型的企業其併購最適門檻值及併購選擇權價值的一般式，最後，將實際設定的參數帶入模型，結果發現時間偏好不一致的公司管理者較時間偏好一致的公司管理者傾向於提前併購，其中成熟型公司管理者相較於幼稚型公司管理者更傾向於提前併購。

In the literatures which discussed merger and acquisition, the future payoffs are all discounted by exponential function, this assumption implies that participants in the market are time-consistent preferences, and their preferences can’t change as time goes by, but in the actual market, this assumption is impractical, participants’ preferences for future payoff do change with time. This article explores the optimal decision for M&A (Merger and Acquisition) when manager of an enterprise is time-inconsistent preference, the proposed models in this article are based on the framework of Lambrecht(2004), and the manager’s preference is described with quasi hyperbolic function. We discuss the optimal decision for merger and acquisition as sophisticated manager and naïve manager respectively. First, we use the model of Lambrecht(2004) to get the general expression of optimal threshold and option value for M&A when manager of an enterprise is time-consistent preferences, then we introduce quasi hyperbolic discounting function into the model of Lambrecht(2004) to get the general expression of optimal threshold and option value for M&A when manager of an enterprise is sophisticated and naïve respectively, finally, we substitute the actual parameter settings into the proposed model, the results shows that the manager with time-inconsistent preferences tends to execute M&A activity earlier than manager with time-consistent preferences, and sophisticated manager tends to execute M&A activity earlier than naïve manager.

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