本研究以是否屬於集團企業之ㄧ員作為融資限制之分類標準，若如同傳統理論所倡導的:融資限制會影響公司之投資和現金流量間之敏感性時，則集團企業其投資對現金流量之敏感度應該比獨立型企業低，本研究欲藉由台灣集團企業和非集團企業之相關財務數據檢視此項議題。此外，本研究透過檢視個別公司特性變數(規模、年齡、槓桿、股權結構)和企業其內部現金流量間之相互影響，探討公司特性對公司投資-現金流量敏感度之影響。
研究發現集團企業或非集團企業其內部現金流量多寡會影響公司之投資決策，且非集團企業之投資-現金流量敏感度比集團企業高，顯示隸屬集團之公司較不會面臨融資限制，獨立型公司面臨融資限制的可能性則較高。在公司規模方面，規模較大之公司其投資對現金流量之敏感性比規模較小之公司低；在公司年齡方面，年輕型之集團企業或非集團企業遭受融資限制之可能性較高，成熟型之集團企業或非集團企業則較無融資受限，表示公司之投資-現金流量敏感度會受到公司年齡之影響；在財務槓桿方面，高財務槓桿公司面臨融資限制之可能性較高，低財務槓桿公司則較無融資受限；在股權結構方面，當集團企業之管理當局持股比率高或控制席次比率低或本國法人機構持股比率低時，其投資-現金流量敏感度較小，即較無融資受限，而非集團企業之內部人持股比率高或大股東持股比率高時，其投資-現金流量敏感度較小，即面臨融資限制之可能性較低。

Group-affiliated firms are widely believed to have more access to funds relative to independent firms because of their ability to use internal capital market benefits and to tap more external financial resources. If a firm’s financial constraint status really affects its investment – cash flow sensitivity as advocated by the traditional literature, then business group firms should exhibit significantly lower sensitivity than that of stand-alone firms. The purpose of this study is to examine this issue by using detailed data on a large sample of Taiwan group-affiliated firms and independent firms. Further, this paper investigates the influence of the numerous firm characteristics (eg. size, age, leverage and ownership) on group-affiliation’s investment – cash flow sensitivity by examining the interactions between numerous firm characteristics and group-affiliation’s cash flow.
The results of this study can be summarized as follows. This paper finds a strong investment – cash flow sensitivity for both group-affiliated and independent firms. Moreover, independent firms’ investment – cash flow sensitivity is higher than Group-affiliated firms. The empirical results also indicate group-affiliated firms’ significant investment – cash flow sensitivity is influenced by numerous firm characteristics such as size, age, leverage and ownership. The investment – cash flow sensitivity is lower for large-sized, mature or lower-leveraged group-affiliated firms. Group-affiliated firms with higher management ownership holdings, lower seating rights or lower domestic institution ownership holdings also have lower investment – cash flow sensitivity. Such kinds of group-affiliated firms are less constrained.

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