本研究檢視了標準普爾(Standard & Poor’s)債務信用等級之調整與受評公司爆發舞弊訴訟案件可能性之間的關聯性。我們發現於信用評等機構改革法案(Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006)實施之後，受評公司於遭受控訴舞弊前之信用等級可能已預先被信用評等機構調降。此外，公司遭受控訴所造成的市場反應將因為事前的信用評等調降而減緩。而此項研究結果提供了當前對信用評等是否有效之爭議進一步的證據(U.S. Department of Justice 2013; Crabtree and Maher 2005; Yi and Mullineaux 2006)，並且幫助投資大眾瞭解信用評等所隱含受評公司財務報導風險的預測價值。我們的結論支持了信用評等機構改革法案的效果，該法案提升了信用評等的品質及時效性，以及信用評等的調降可以提醒資本市場對受評公司爆發訴訟的風險加以警戒。

Our paper examines the relation between the adjustment of Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) credit rating and the likelihood of a firm with securities fraud litigation. We find that the downgrade of credit rating was less (more) likely to occur prior to the lawsuit before (after) the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA 2006) was implemented. Besides, a securities fraud litigated firm with prior downgraded credit rating experienced relatively lower negative market reactions than those without downgrades. Our findings provide some evidence to answer the recent debate whether credit rating releases useful information (U.S. Department of Justice 2013; Crabtree and Maher 2005; Yi and Mullineaux 2006) and helps public investors to realize the predictability of S&P’s credit rating on a firm’s financial reporting risk. Our results support that the CRARA 2006 has improved the quality and timeliness of credit rating agencies, and the downgrade of credit rating in fact signals capital market participants increased litigation risk of a firm.

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