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研究生: 楊琇媛
Yang, Hsiu-Yuan
論文名稱: 公司治理與海外籌資
Corporate Governance and Global Financing: the Evidence in Taiwan
指導教授: 陳嬿如
Chen, Yenn-Ru
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 會計學系
Department of Accountancy
論文出版年: 2005
畢業學年度: 93
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 63
中文關鍵詞: 最終控制股東存託憑證股權結構海外可轉換公司債
外文關鍵詞: Ultimate Controlling Shareholders, Ownership Structure, Euro Convertible Bonds, Deposit Receipts
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  •   本篇論文主要目的是檢視有進行海外投資的台灣上市公司,在海外融資後公司治理層面的變化,公司治理層面的因素包括有股權結構、董事會特性以及最終控制股東的控制權與現金流量權。隨著資本市場的國際化,企業的融資行為不再只是侷限於國內,大部分的企業都已經有國際化的趨勢或是和跨國企業有商業上的往來,企業至海外尋求資金的機會也因此而增加。最常見的海外籌資工具包括海外存託憑證(ADR/GDR)和海外可轉換公司債(ECB),發行成功與否決定於發行公司的信用評等,而公司治理層面也會因此而有所改善。本篇論文的實證結果顯示,最終控制股東的控制權與現金流量權在海外籌資後有明顯的下降,但是兩者的偏離程度卻沒有顯著的變化,這也表示大小股東之間的利益衝突會因為最終控制股東所有權與控制權的降低而有些微的改善,但是兩者的偏離程度仍然不變。
      此外,股權結構在海外籌資與國內籌資間有顯著的不同,進行海外籌資的公司,有較高的金融機構持股與外資法人持股以及較低的董事會持股,這顯示了在海外資本市場籌資的公司有較健全的股權結構。
      在檢視海外籌資與國內籌資公司之間的董事會特性時,並沒有發現明顯的不同,但是董事會的組成在這兩個群體中卻有同時改善的跡象,除了內部董事與灰色董事(gray directors) 減少外,獨立董事也有增加的趨勢,而董事會結構的改善可歸因於近年來社會大眾與企業對公司治理層面的重視。

     This study investigates the change of corporate governance after global financing for Taiwanese firms with international business activities. Specifically, the changes of ultimate controlling shareholders’ control and ownership right, ownership structure, and board characteristic are examined. Following the internationalization of capital markets, business financing is no longer limited to be in home country. Many firms in Taiwan are either internationalized firms or highly interacting with global businesses, and their business activities may increase the probability to seek for financing in global capital markets. Two major financing instruments used by Taiwanese firms are deposit receipts (ADR or GDR) and Euro convertible bond (ECB). The success of issuing is contingent on the credibility of the issuing firms, and global issuing would also lead to the improvement of corporate governance of the issuing firms. Empirical results show that the ultimate controlling shareholders’ control and ownership right significantly fall after global financing while the divergence of control right and cash flow right is not significantly changed. It also indicates that the interest conflict between majority and minority shareholder alleviates lightly but the voting premium still exists.

     In addition, the ownership structure between global-financing firms and domestic financing firms is significantly different. The proportion of financial institution and foreign ownership of global financing firms is higher and with lower board ownership, implying that better ownership structure is associated with global financing. As examining the board characteristics between global-financing and domestic- financing firms, there is no significant difference, though the board composition of global-financing and domestic- financing firms improves simultaneously. However, their influential power over the board of directors is not practically decreased. The improvement of board composition for both groups may attribute to the governance respect in recent year.

    Abstract...........................................................i Chapter 1 Introduction........................................................1 Chapter 2 Literature Review.......................6  2.1 Foreign Expansion.............................................6  2.2 Foreign Financing Activity....................................9  2.3 Capital Structure and Financing Activity......................12  2.4 Corporate Governance in Taiwan................................13  2.5 Corporate Governance and Financing Activity...................16  2.6 Regulations Governing the Offering and Issuance of Overseas Securities     by Issuers....................................................17 Chapter 3 Development of Hypotheses.................................24 Chapter 4 Methodology and Data......................................28  4.1 Methodology and Variable Definition...........................28  4.2 Data & Sample Selection.......................................38  4.3 Data Description..............................................38 Chapter 5 Empirical Results.........................................41  5.1Statistics of governance in the issuing year...................41  5.2Summary statistics for Pre- and Post-Global Financing..........41  5.3Analysis of the change of governance characteristics...........43  5.5The Result of Logistic Regression..............................46 Chapter 6Conclusion.................................................56 Reference ...........................................................59

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