本研究主要探討具有財會專長之獨立董事是否能有效抑制盈餘管理。透過分別探討若公司大多數之獨立董事皆具有財會專長與盈餘平穩化及財報重述之關係，並進一步研究若同時兼具超過兩席之董事職位之忙碌獨立董事，其監督效果是否會受到影響。研究結果顯示，公司之獨立董事若大多數皆具有財會專長是能夠有效抑制管理當局進行盈餘平穩化及減少財報重述發生之機率，兩者皆與財會專長之獨立董事呈現顯著負項關係。但忙碌的獨立董事，其抑制盈餘平穩化及財報重述之效果將會降低。

This study examines whether independent directors who are financial experts can constrain earnings management effectively. Specifically, the relationship between a board of directors dominated by financial experts and income smoothing behavior is investigated. Also, I extend income smoothing behavior to financial restatement. In particular, I examine the relationship between a board of directors dominated by financial experts and the probability of financial restatement. In addition, I examine whether busy independent directors who hold more than two directorships weaken board monitoring. My results show that boards of directors dominated by financial experts are significantly and negatively associated with income smoothing and financial restatement. However, the busyness of outside directors with financial expertise weaken the monitoring effect of financial expert directors on income smoothing and financial restatement.

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