| 研究生: |
謝佳儒 Hsieh, Chia-Ju |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
大股東所有權與董事會治理之關聯:以中國上市公司為例 Large shareholder and board governance: Evidence from Chinese listed firms |
| 指導教授: |
黃炳勳
Huang, Ping-Hsun |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 財務金融研究所 Graduate Institute of Finance |
| 論文出版年: | 2022 |
| 畢業學年度: | 110 |
| 語文別: | 英文 |
| 論文頁數: | 33 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 公司治理 、董事會治理 、股東所有權 、外部董事 、CEO雙重性 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | corporate governance, board governance, shareholder ownership, outside director, CEO duality |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:199 下載:0 |
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本研究採用中國股票市場之非金融業公司2011-2015年期間的10,416筆公司年資料為樣本,探討大股東所有權類型與董事會治理之關聯。研究發現家族所有權和機構所有權皆以不同方式影響公司董事會治理。其中,當家族所有權越大,董事會中外部董事比率會減小,CEO兼任董事長的可能性會提升。機構所有權與董事會治理之間的關聯則取決於機構投資人的地緣關係(國內或國外)和監督強度(主動或被動)。整體而言,此實證結果顯示,家族所有權和機構所有權皆與董事會治理品質有關。
In this study, I examine the relation between the types of large shareholder ownership and board governance by using a sample of 10,416 Chinese firm-years during the period 2011-2015. I find that both family ownership and institutional ownership influence board governance in various ways. Greater family ownership is related to a smaller proportion of outside directors in the board and a higher likelihood of CEO duality. The association between institutional ownership and board governance depends on the geographic origin (foreign vs. domestic) and monitoring intensity (active vs. passive) of institutional investors. Overall, my results suggest that both family ownership and institutional ownership are related to the governance quality of a board of directors.
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校內:2027-06-27公開