| 研究生: |
陳韋志 Chen, Wei-Chih |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
Nash議價理論下的供應商選擇:對議價能力的高低與關稅轉嫁協商之研究探討 Supplier Selection under the Nash Bargaining Framework: A Study on Bargaining Power and Tariff Pass-Through Negotiations |
| 指導教授: |
謝中奇
Hsieh, Chung-Chi |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 工業與資訊管理學系 Department of Industrial and Information Management |
| 論文出版年: | 2026 |
| 畢業學年度: | 114 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 87 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 供應商選擇 、Nash 議價模型 、不對稱議價 、議價權重 、關稅成本分攤 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Supplier Selection, Nash Bargaining Model, Asymmetric Bargaining, Bargaining Weight, Tariff Cost Sharing |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:144 下載:3 |
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近年全球供應鏈受到關稅調整、貿易政策變動與地緣政治衝突影響,企業在進行供應商選擇時,已不適合僅依照初始成本條件進行判斷。在包含關稅之採購環境下,最終交易結果亦可能受到關稅分攤比例、買賣雙方談判地位及議價後協議價格影響。因此,本研究旨在建立一套整合供應商選擇、關稅成本分攤與不對稱議價之分析架構。
本研究以不對稱 Nash 議價模型為基礎,建構單一買方與多家候選供應商之雙邊議價模型,將供應商單位成本基礎、關稅稅率、關稅分攤比例及買方議價權重納入分析,推導各候選供應商之最適協議價格與雙方每單位利潤,再依買方利潤最大化原則進行供應商選擇。本研究以 K 公司三家候選供應商為個案,進行基準情境及關稅稅率、議價權重、關稅分攤比例與綜合情境分析。
研究結果顯示,供應商選擇結果並不必然與成本條件排序一致。基準情境下,供應商 A 雖具有較高成本基礎,但因關稅分攤比例與買方議價權重較高,最終形成最高買方利潤。此外,議價權重與關稅分攤比例皆可能改變協議價格與利潤結果,且兩者不宜視為相同變數。
綜合而言,本研究將供應商選擇由「議價前條件比較」延伸至「議價後交易結果比較」,所建構之模型可作為企業在含關稅與不同談判情境下,進行供應商比較與採購決策之參考。
In recent years, global supply chains have been affected by tariff adjustments, trade policy changes, and geopolitical conflicts. In a tariff-inclusive procurement environment, supplier selection should not rely solely on initial cost conditions, since final transaction outcomes may also be influenced by tariff-sharing ratios, bargaining positions, and negotiated agreement prices.
This study develops an asymmetric Nash bargaining model to analyze supplier selection involving one buyer and multiple candidate suppliers. Supplier unit cost basis, tariff rates, tariff-sharing ratios, and buyer bargaining weights are incorporated to derive the optimal agreement price and per-unit profits. Using three candidate suppliers of Company K as a case study, this research compares supplier outcomes under baseline and scenario analyses.
The results show that supplier selection outcomes do not necessarily follow the ranking of cost conditions. Under the baseline scenario, Supplier A has a higher cost basis but generates the highest buyer profit due to its higher tariff-sharing ratio and the buyer’s higher bargaining weight. The findings also indicate that bargaining weights and tariff-sharing ratios may affect agreement prices and profit outcomes differently.
Overall, this study extends supplier selection from pre-bargaining condition comparison to post-bargaining transaction outcome comparison. The proposed model can serve as a reference for firms making procurement decisions under tariff-inclusive and asymmetric bargaining conditions.
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