新上市公司(Initial Public Offerings, IPOs)的議題一向為學術界及實務界的研究焦點，然而，規劃上市時程通常是企業生命週期重要的階段之一，因此，上市對企業來說，必定存有相當大的誘因，以往文獻分別指出新上市公司盈餘操縱的行為可能在籌資前後發生，亦可能與內部人股權結構有關；基於公司可能以籌資或是內部人自利作為上市目的，本研究探討企業管理階層在面臨初次上市時，以實現內部人利益極大化及以資金需求為上市動機之公司，分析及檢測上市後盈餘管理行為與影響。
本研究以1998年至2003年於台灣證券交易所新上市之公司為研究對象，經篩選後得到280家樣本公司。實證結果顯示：
一、以裁決性應計項目之絕對值檢定上市前一年至上市後第二年之盈餘管理程度，發現公司的確在上市前一年度至上市後二年有盈餘管理行為。
二、企業成立時間長短在上市後一年、上市後二年與裁決性應計項目呈正相關；而在上市當年度則企業成立時間長短與裁決性應計項目不呈正相關。
三、以上市當年度、上市後一年、上市後二年來說，流動比率變動幅度與裁決性應計項目成正相關。
四、上市當年度有資金需求的公司，其財務預測差異程度與盈餘管理程度成正相關。上市後一年及上市後二年有資金需求的公司，其公司成立時間長短及流動比率變動幅度，均與裁決性應計項目呈正相關。
五、對2001年3月前IPO的公司而言，董監事持股比率變動僅在上市當年度及上市後一年與盈餘管理程度成正相關；而大股東持股比率變動僅於上市後二年與裁決性應計項目呈正相關。對2001年3月後IPO的公司來說，董監事持股比率變動在上市後一年、上市後二年與盈餘管理程度成正相關；大股東持股比率變動於上市後一年及上市後二年與裁決性應計項目呈正相關。
六、上市當年度及上市後一年有資金需求的公司，比沒有資金需求的公司存在顯著盈餘管理行為；上市後二年有資金需求的公司，並未比上市後二年沒有資金需求的公司存在顯著盈餘管理行為。
七、資金需求金額與盈餘管理程度在上市當年度至上市後二年互為反向關係；資金需求規模(資金需求金額 / 期初總資產)則與盈餘管理程度呈正相關。也就是說，新上市公司資金需求金額愈高者大部份屬於成長型企業，其營業績效多為持續成長，盈餘管理動機較不強烈；當公司資金需求規模愈大，盈餘管理程度愈強。
八、資金需求金額隨上市時間愈久，對盈餘管理程度影響程度愈小。

Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) is an important topic for academic and practical research. However, planning to go public is usually considered a critical phase in an enterprise life cycle. Thus, going public must be of sizable inducement for enterprise. The former studies indicated that earnings management might happen surrounding the seasoned equity offerings or issuing bonds, and it might have relations to insiders’ stock ownership. Considered the companies might deem the opportunity of going public to mainly raise funds or maximize insider people’s profit, the main purpose of this study is to examine that the managers of the IPOs how to manage earnings while going public, and whether IPOs with different motivations of going public, such as maximize insider people’s profit, raise funds, manipulate earnings after going public.
The sample examined consists of 280 IPO firms in Taiwan Stock Exchange between 1998 and 2003. The empirical results are shown as below.
First, when using the absolute value of discretionary accruals to test whether the IPOs manipulate earnings surrounding going public, the results show that the managements of IPOs do manipulate earnings surrounding going public.
Second, the independent variable, months, is with positive relation to discretionary accruals in year t+1 and t+2, and it is with negative relation to discretionary accruals in year t.
Third, the independent variable, the change of current ratio, is with positive relation to discretionary accruals from year t to t+2.
Fourth, the independent variable, forecast error, is with positive relation to discretionary accruals in the companies which have demand of capital in year t. Nevertheless, the independent variables, months, the change of current ratio, and the size of capital, are with positive relation to discretionary accruals in the companies which have demand of capital in year t+1 and t+2.
Fifth, the samples are divided into two groups, the IPOs which went public before and after March, 2001. The independent variable, the ratio of the change of stock held by directors, is with positive relation to discretionary accruals in year t and t+1, and the ratio of the change of stock held by blockholders, is with positive relation to them in year t+2 when the IPOs went public before March, 2001. However, the ratio of the change of stock held by directors, is with positive relation to discretionary accruals from year t to t+2, and the ratio of the change of stock held by blockholders, is with positive relation to them in year t+1 and t+2 when the IPOs went public in March, 2001.
Sixth, the IPOs which have demand of capital in year t and year t+1, have more incentive to manipulate earnings than those don’t have demand of capital. Therefore, the IPOs which have demand of capital in year t+2 don’t have more incentive to manipulate earnings than those don’t have demand of capital.
Seventh, the independent variable, the amount of capital, is with negative relation to discretionary accruals, but the size of capital is with positive relation to them in the IPOs which have demand of capital in year t, t+1 and t+2. That is, most IPOs with continous growth in their operating performance belong to growth enterprises. Thus, the managers of the IPOs have less incentive to manage earnings. The larger size of capital, the more range of earnings management.
Eighth, the effect of the amount of capital decrease gradually on earnings management in the IPOs from year t to year t+2.

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