簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示

研究生: 戴亞萱
Tai, Ya-Hsuan
論文名稱: 強制採用XBRL對於CEO超額薪酬之影響
Mandatory XBRL adoption and CEO excess compensation
指導教授: 周庭楷
Chou, Ting-Kai
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 會計學系
Department of Accountancy
論文出版年: 2018
畢業學年度: 106
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 28
中文關鍵詞: XBRLCEO超額薪酬資訊處理成本代理問題
外文關鍵詞: XBRL, CEO excess compensation, information processing cost, agency problem
相關次數: 點閱:171下載:3
分享至:
查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報
  • 本研究以XBRL可降低投資者的資訊處理成本、提升資訊透明度,進而提升外部監督效能之角度探討採用XBRL是否有效降低CEO超額薪酬。本研究樣本取自於有向SEC申報XBRL格式報導之美國上市公司,檢測實施XBRL前後對於CEO超額薪酬之變化,其實證結果顯示採用XBRL之後能夠降低CEO正超額薪酬之情形。然而本研究發現採用XBRL後對於CEO負超額薪酬的減輕並無效果。再者,本研究進一步分析並發現在代理問題較嚴重的公司,XBRL降低CEO正超額薪酬的效果更明顯。本研究顯示採用XBRL有助於降低投資者的資訊處理成本,提升市場外部監督力道,降低公司管理階層與投資者間的代理問題。

    This study uses XBRL to reduce investor information processing cost, to improve the transparency of information, and to enhance the effectiveness of external oversight to discuss whether XBRL can effectively reduce CEO excess compensation. We use the companies reporting in the XBRL format from the SEC in the U.S. to examine the changes in CEO excess compensation before and after XBRL reporting. We find that XBRL reporting can reduce CEO excess compensation in the positive sample group. However, we find that XBRL reporting has no effect on the reduction of CEO excess compensation in the negative sample group. Furthermore, we also analyze and find that the effect of XBRL reporting is stronger in reducing CEO positive excess pay in companies with more serious agency problems. This study shows that the adoption of XBRL can help reduce investor information processing cost, enhance the effectiveness of external monitoring in the market, and reduce the agency problems between management and investors.

    壹、緒論 1 貳、文獻探討與假說發展 4 一、可延伸性商業報導語言(XBRL) 4 二、CEO薪酬 5 三、假說發展 6 參、樣本與研究方法 8 一、樣本選取 8 二、研究方法設計 8 2.1 CEO超額薪酬之衡量 8 2.2實證模型 9 肆、實證結果分析 13 一、敘述性統計 13 二、迴歸結果 17 伍、結論 22 參考文獻 24 附錄一—變數定義 28

    Adams, R. B. and D. Ferreira, 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94, 291-309.
    Alles, M. and M. Piechocki, 2012. Will XBRL improve corporate governance? A framework for enhancing governance decision making using interactive data. International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, 13, 91-108.
    Armstrong, C. S., C. D. Ittner and D. F. Larcker, 2012. Corporate governance, compensation consultants, and CEO pay levels. Review of Accounting Studies, 17, 322-351.
    Baldwin, A. A., 2011. The impact of XBRL: A Delphi investigation. International Journal of Digital Accounting Research, 11, 1-24.
    Basu, S., L.S. Hwang, T. Mitsudome and J. Weintrop, 2007. Corporate governance, top executive compensation and firm performance in Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 15, 56-79.
    Bauman, M. P. and K. W. Shaw, 2006. Stock option compensation and the likelihood of meeting analysts' quarterly earnings targets. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 26, 301-319.
    Bebchuk, L., A. Cohen and A. Ferrell, 2009. What matters in corporate governance? Review of Financial Studies, 22, 783-827.
    Bebchuk, L. A. and J. M. Fried, 2003. Executive compensation as an agency problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, 71-92.
    Bertrand, M. and K. F. Hallock, 2001. The gender gap in top corporate jobs. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 55, 3-21.
    Blankespoor, E. A., 2012. The impact of investor information processing costs on firm disclosure choice: Evidence from the XBRL mandate. Working Paper, University of Michigan.
    Bloom, M. and G. T. Milkovich, 1998. Relationships among risk, incentive pay, and organizational performance. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 283-297.
    Brick, I. E., O. Palmon and J. K. Wald, 2006. CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism? Journal of Corporate Finance, 12, 403-423.
    Carroll, T. M. and D. H. Ciscel, 1982. The effects of regulation on executive compensation. Review of Economics and Statistics, 64, 505-509.
    Carter, M. E., F. Franco and M. Gine, 2017. Executive gender pay gaps: The roles of female risk aversion and board representation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 34, 1232-1264.
    Chen, G., J.B. Kim, J.H. Lim and J. Zhou, 2017. XBRL adoption and bank loan contracting: early evidence. Journal of Information Systems, Forthcoming
    Chen, J. Z., H. A. Hong, J.B. Kim and J. W. Ryou, 2017. Information processing costs and corporate tax aggressiveness: Evidence from the SEC's XBRL mandate. Working paper, Texas Christian University.
    Cheng, S., 2004. R&D expenditures and CEO compensation. The Accounting Review, 79, 305-328.
    Cheung, Y.L., A. Stouraitis and A. W. Wong, 2005. Ownership concentration and executive compensation in closely held firms: Evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of Empirical Finance, 12, 511-532.
    Chung, K. H. and H. Jo. 1996. The impact of security analysts' monitoring and marketing functions on the market value of firms. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31, 493-512.
    Core, J. E., 1997. On the corporate demand for directors' and officers' insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64, 63-87.
    Core, J. E., 2000. The directors' and officers' insurance premium: An outside assessment of the quality of corporate governance. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 16, 449-477.
    Core, J. E., W. Guay and D. F. Larcker, 2008. The power of the pen and executive compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 88, 1-25.
    Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen and D. F. Larcker, 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation,and firm performance1. Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 371-406.
    Cyert, R. M., S.H. Kang and P. Kumar, 2002. Corporate governance,takeovers, and top-management compensation: Theory and evidence. Management Science, 48, 453-469.
    Dah, M. A. and M. B. Frye, 2017. Is board compensation excessive? Journal of Corporate Finance, 45, 566-585.
    Debreceny, R. S., A. Chandra, J. J. Cheh, D. Guithues-Amrhein, N. J. Hannon, P. D. Hutchison, D. Janvrin, R. A. Jones, B. Lamberton and A. Lymer, M.Mascha,R.Nehmer,S.Roohani,R.P.Srivastava,
    S.Trabelsi,T.Tribunella, G. Trites, M. A. Vasarhelyi, 2005. Financial Reporting in XBRL on the SEC's EDGAR System: A critique and evaluation. Journal of Information Systems, 19, 191-210.
    Dong, Y., O. Z. Li, Y. Lin and C. Ni, 2016. Does information-processing cost affect firm-specific information acquisition? Evidence from XBRL adoption. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 51, 435-462.
    Efendi, J., J. D. Park and C. Subramaniam, 2010. Do XBRL reports have incremental information content? An empirical analysis. Working Paper, The University of Texas at Arlington and Towson University.
    Ertimur, Y., F. Ferri and V. Muslu, 2010. Shareholder activism and CEO pay. Review of Financial Studies, 24, 535-592.
    Finkelstein, S. and D. C. Hambrick, 1989. Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes. Strategic Management Journal, 10, 121-134.
    Gray, G. L. and D. W. Miller, 2009. XBRL: Solving real-world problems. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 6, 207-223.
    Griffin, P., H. Hong, J. Kim and J. Lim, 2014. The SEC’s XBRL mandate and credit risk: Evidence on a link between credit default swap pricing and XBRL disclosure. Working paper, University of California.
    Grinstein, Y. and P. Hribar, 2004. CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses. Journal of Financial Economics, 73, 119-143.
    Hadley, B., 2016. Executive compensation and political sensitivity: Evidence from government contractors. Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming.
    Hallock, K. F., 1997. Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32, 331-344.
    Hartzell, J. C. and L. T. Starks, 2003. Institutional investors and executive compensation. Journal of Finance, 58, 2351-2374.
    Hirst, D. E. and P. E. Hopkins, 1998. Comprehensive income reporting and analysts' valuation judgments. Journal of Accounting Research, 36, 47-75.
    Hodge, F. D., J. J. Kennedy and L. A. Maines, 2004. Does search-facilitating technology improve the transparency of financial reporting? The Accounting Review, 79, 687-703.
    Holthausen, R. W., D. F. Larcker and R. G. Sloan, 1995. Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19, 29-74.
    Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
    Jensen, M. C. and K. J. Murphy, 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225-264.
    Joskow, P. L., N. L. Rose and C. D. Wolfram, 1996. Political constraints on executive compensation:Evidence from the electric utility industry. RAND Journal of Economics, 27, 165-182.
    Kim, J. B., L. Bing and L. Zhenbin. 2014. Who benefits more from XBRL adoption? Evidence from breadth of ownership. Working Paper, University of Waterloo.
    Kim, J. W., J.H. Lim and W. G. No, 2012. The effect of first wave mandatory XBRL reporting across the financial information environment. Journal of Information Systems, 26, 127-153.
    Lambert, R. A., D. F. Larcker and K. Weigelt, 1993. The structure of organizational incentives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 438-461.
    Li, O. Z., C. Ni and Y. Lin, 2012. Does XBRL adoption reduce the cost of equity capital? Working Paper, National University of Singapore.
    Liu, C., T. Wang and L. J. Yao, 2014. XBRL’s impact on analyst forecast behavior: An empirical study. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 33, 69-82.
    Masulis, R. W., C. Wang and F. Xie, 2009. Agency problems at dual‐class companies. Journal of Finance, 64, 1697-1727.
    Mehran, H., 1995. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 163-184.
    Murphy, K. J. 1987. Executive compensation in regulated utilities. Working Paper, University of Rochester.
    Premuroso, R. F. and S. Bhattacharya, 2008. Do early and voluntary filers of financial information in XBRL format signal superior corporate governance and operating performance? International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, 9, 1-20.
    Smith Jr, C. W. and R. L. Watts, 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 263-292.
    Tosi, H. L., S. Werner, J. P. Katz and L. R. Gomez-Mejia, 2000. How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO pay studies. Journal of Management, 26, 301-339.
    Vasarhelyi, M. A., D. Y. Chan and J. P. Krahel, 2012. Consequences of XBRL standardization on financial statement data. Journal of Information Systems, 26, 155-167.
    Wright, P. and M. Kroll, 2002. Executive discretion and corporate performance as determinants of CEO compensation, contingent on external monitoring activities. Journal of Management and Governance, 6, 189-214.
    Yermack, D., 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185-211.
    Yoon, H., H. Zo and A. P. Ciganek, 2011. Does XBRL adoption reduce information asymmetry? Journal of Business Research, 64, 157-163.

    下載圖示 校內:2023-06-01公開
    校外:2023-06-01公開
    QR CODE