由於金融自由化以及全球金融體系都朝向綜合銀行制度所帶來的跨業經營效益思考方向前進，我國也不落人後終於在2001年通過金融控股公司法，使金融機構跨業經營有了法源依據。而其中跟本研究最有關的法條就是第29條，其規定金融控股母公司須百分之百持有傘下子公司，其所帶來的不只是母公司可以統籌支配資源之正面效益而已；還有因為百分之百持有，而可以任意指派傘下子公司董監事所帶來的種種利弊，例如同ㄧ人同時擔任多間子公司董監事而產生的董事會連結所造成的結果。因此本研究主要是配合著研究假說的方式，以個案研究來探討控股型態、董事會連結與經營績效。

　　研究結果發現此種母公司百分之百持有之長期股權投資方式和經營績效呈現高度正相關，但其所指派的法人由於型態與動機不一，對於子公司間的經營績效結果不一致。至於董事會連結方面，由於垂直連結會有交叉持股所帶來的問題，因此對績效呈現正、負相關；至於其他的水平連結或其他連結型態，都可推測歸納和經營績效有著高度正相關。

　For financial liberalization and global financial systems all moved toward the concepts of universal banking system which implied across-business benefits. Followed by this trend, Taiwan approved the law of financial holding company. From this moment, the across-business of Taiwan’s financial institutions had law basis.

　The most related law of financial holding company to the research was number twenty nine. It ruled that parent companies must hold one hundred percent stares of its subsidiaries. This meant that on the one hand parent companies could made an overall plan and allocated resources, and on the other parent companies could nominated directorates and supervisors of subsidiaries. The former meant the advantage of parent companies hold one hundred percent stares of its subsidiaries and the latter maybe implied adverse effects .For example, one who occupied many positions of directorates and supervisors in subsidiaries simultaneously may resulted in the both sides effects of interlocking directorate. So we analyzed the holding types、interlocking directorate and business effects by case studies.

　We found that parent companies hold one hundred percent stares of its subsidiaries. This kind of long-run shares investment had highly positive related to the business effects. The outcome between business effects and assigned legal person were varied as results of different types and motives. As to interlocking directorate, the outcome between business effects and vertical interlocking were varied as results of intersect shares. The outcome between business effects and horizontal interlocking were highly positive related.

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