| 研究生: |
李佳霈 Lee, Chia-Pei |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
獨立董事與企業負債水準對企業避稅之影響 The Effects of Independent Directors and Leverage on Corporate Tax Avoidance |
| 指導教授: |
林軒竹
Lin, Hsuan-Chu |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 財務金融研究所碩士在職專班 Graduate Institute of Finance (on the job class) |
| 論文出版年: | 2017 |
| 畢業學年度: | 105 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 30 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 現金有效稅率 、租稅規避 、負債水準 、獨立董事比例 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Cash Effective Tax Rates, Tax Avoidance, Leverage, Proportion of Independent Directors |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:142 下載:2 |
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本文以代理問題角度,檢視獨立董事及負債水準是否影響企業租稅規避程度,同時探討獨立董事對負債水準與租稅規避之抵換關係的影響。以臺灣一般產業上市櫃公司為對象,資料從2010 年至2016 年,實證結果指出,在其他條件不變下,設置獨立董事比例愈高之企業,租稅規避可能性相對降低,顯示獨立董事比例愈高,愈能達到監督企業租稅規避的作用;進行租稅規避之企業負債比例相對較低,透過所獲租稅利益以抑制對外舉債的需求,即負債水準與租稅規避行為具替代關係。此外,研究發現,於公司治理機制下,提高企業獨立董事比例較能抑制企業負債水準與租稅規避之替代關係。
This paper, with listed and over-the-counter (OTC) companies in Taiwan as the samples,examines whether independent directors and leverage affect the tax avoidance of a company from an agency issue perspective, and explores the effect of independent directors on the trade-off between leverage and tax avoidance.
The empirical results show that, with other conditions fixed, the higher the proportion of independent directors, the better is the corporate tax avoidance monitoring effect. A company which engages in tax avoidance suppresses the demand for external debt through the tax benefits gained. That is, there is a trade-off between leverage and tax avoidance.
In addition, the study found that under the corporate governance mechanism, a higher proportion of independent directors can better suppress the trade-off between corporate leverage and tax avoidance.
壹、中文部分
(一)論文
1.曾柏維(2015),「集團企業交易與租稅規避之關聯性研究」,國立政治大學財政學系研究所碩士論文。
(二)期刊
1.林嬌能(2016),「獨立董事在企業租稅規劃的監督效果」,會計審計論叢,第6卷第1期,頁55-86。
2.黃美祝與汪瑞芝(2015),「企業避稅對負債水準之影響」,會計審計論叢,第5卷第2期,頁1-32。
3.魏妤珊、廖俊煌與黃法蓉(2016),「董事身份特性與企業風險管理對企業避稅之影響」,商管科技季刊,第17卷第2期,頁149。
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