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研究生： 許瓊云
Hsu, Chiung-Yun
論文名稱： 在資訊不對稱下二階段供應鏈品質合約設計之研究
A Quality Contract Design in Two-stage Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information
指導教授： 謝中奇
Hsieh, Chung-Chi
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 管理學院 - 工業與資訊管理學系
Department of Industrial and Information Management
論文出版年： 2013
畢業學年度： 101
語文別： 中文
論文頁數： 61
中文關鍵詞： 不對稱資訊 、品質改善 、檢驗策略 、賽局理論
外文關鍵詞： Asymmetric information, Quality improvement, Inspection policy, Game theory
相關次數： 點閱：169  下載：11 
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    • IC設計產業在台灣具有完整的生產結構，例如，TFT-LCD面板最為關鍵的零組件驅動IC(Driver IC)，其影響面板的品質甚大，因此產品的研發技術及品質成為IC設計產業重要的競爭優勢。驅動IC供應鏈中，IC設計廠商扮演一主導的角色，設計廠除了需要良好的上游零件供應商外，還必須確保下游系統廠的生產良率水準，才能提供高品質的驅動IC給面板客戶端。有鑑於此，設計廠商期望找出能提升產品品質並降低生產成本的方法，以最大化整體供應鏈之期望獲利。此外，近年來有許多研究探討供應鏈上下游之最佳均衡策略，但這些研究都針對上下游成員彼此具有相同的資訊，而未考慮到各成員擁有的資訊多寡，亦即供應鏈有資訊不對稱的情況；基於上述，成員們如何在資訊不對稱環境下考量各項決策因素，進行最大化整體供應鏈利潤為本研究的核心。
    承上所述，本研究建立一個以設計廠商為主導，且由設計廠商與一系統廠組成的二階段供應鏈模型，利用賽局理論方法求解系統廠與設計廠在資訊對稱下的最佳策略，接著針對資訊不對稱情境下，也就是設計廠不知道系統廠的生產良率資訊時，設計廠商如何設計一誘因合約，誘使系統廠揭露其真實良率資訊給設計廠，並分析成員間之最佳決策和期望利潤。從研究中，我們發現誘因合約可誘使系統廠揭露真實資訊，當系統廠為較高良率時，能作出與集中式系統相同的決策並達到最佳獲利；而在系統廠為較低良率時，也能使決策與利潤趨近於最佳狀態的集中式系統。且低生產良率系統廠在市場上的機率越高，對於設計廠商的期望獲利越低。因此，誘因合約亦能改善系統廠的生產良率，以獲得更高的利潤。

    IC design industry in Taiwan has a complete production structure,in which one of the most critical components that affect the quality of the LCD panel is the driver IC. Driver IC designers need to ensure the production yield of the system-provider firms,in order to provide high quality products to panel makers. For this reason,designers aim to enhance the quality of products and reduce production costs, to maximize the total expected profit of the entire supply chain. Previous studies usually assume symmetric market information between supply chain members,without taking into account the fact that the members could have asymmetric information. Hence,this study examines the decision-making process of the chain members under asymmetric information.
    This thesis considers a supply chain with a dominant(IC) designer and a system-provider firm,and constructs a model in which the system-provider firm's yield is private information and unknown to the designer. It further designs an incentive contract,and induces the system-provider firm to report his true information. The analysis reveals that when the system-provider firm's yield is at a higher level, the decisions and profits were the same as those in the centralized chain. Additionally,when the system-provider firm's yield is at lower level, the decisions and profits will be close to those in the centralized chain. Finally, when the probability of the lower yield level of the system-provider firm is higher, the expected profit of the designer will be lower.

    摘要 i Abstract ii 致謝 iii 圖目錄 vi 表目錄 viii 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究背景與動機………………………………………………………… 1 1.2 研究目的…………………………………………………………………2 1.3 研究流程…………………………………………………………………3 1.4 研究架構……………………………………………………………………4 第二章 文獻探討 6 2.1 不對稱資訊…………………………………………………………………6 2.2 品質改善…………………………………………………………………10 2.3 檢驗政策…………………………………………………………………12 2.4 賽局理論…………………………………………………………………14 2.5小結………………………………………………………………………16 第三章 模式建構與發展 18 3.1 模式環境………………………………………………………………18 3.1.1 模式假設……………………………………………………………20 3.1.2 符號定義…………………………………………………………….21 3.2 資訊對稱下分散式系統………………………………………………22 3.2.1利潤函式建構………………………………………………………..23 3.2.2分散式系統下之均衡策略…………………………………………...27 3.3 資訊對稱下集中式系統………………………………………………28 3.4 資訊不對稱下分散式系統……………………………………………30 3.4.1 Principal-Agent Model(主顧模型)………………………………..30 3.4.2 加入誘因合約之資訊不對稱下分散式系統…………………….32 3.5 小結……………………………………………………………………………37 第四章 數值分析與敏感度分析 38 4.1 數值分析………………………………………………………………………38 4.1.1 參數設定……………………………………………………………..39 4.1.2 各情境決策與獲利比較……………………………………………..40 4.2 參數敏感度分析………………………………………………………………41 4.2.1 檢驗成本函數係數c_a分析…………………………………………..43 4.2.2 罰金倍數分析………………………………………………………..45 4.2.3 產品銷售價格R分析……………………………………………….49 4.2.4 系統廠類型之市場機率p分析……………………………………….52 4.3小結…………………………………………………………………………….53 第五章 結論與未來研究方向 54 5.1 結論……………………………………………………………………………54 5.2 未來研究方向…………………………………………………………………55 參考文獻 57 圖目錄 1.1研究流程圖……………………………………………………………………5 3.1驅動IC供應鏈關係圖………………………………………………………19 3.2樹狀圖………………………………………………………………………23 3.3 利益模式圖……………………………………………………………………31 4.1 c_a對於資訊對稱下設計廠商與系統廠決策的影響…………………………43 4.2 c_a對於資訊對稱下設計廠商與系統廠獲利的影響…………………………44 4.3 c_a對於資訊不對稱下設計廠商與系統廠決策的影響………………………45 4.4 c_a對於資訊不對稱下設計廠商與系統廠獲利的影響………………………45 4.5 r_ao對於資訊對稱下設計廠商與系統廠決策的影響………………………46 4.6 r_ao對於資訊對稱下設計廠商與系統廠獲利的影響………………………47 4.7 r_ao對於資訊不對稱下設計廠商與系統廠決策的影響……………………47 4.8 r_ao對於資訊不對稱下設計廠商與系統廠獲利的影響……………………48 4.9 r_d對於資訊對稱下設計廠商與系統廠決策的影響………………………48 4.10 r_d對於資訊對稱下設計廠商與系統廠獲利的影響………………………49 4.11 r_d對於資訊不對稱下設計廠商與系統廠決策的影響……………………49 4.12 r_d對於資訊不對稱下設計廠商與系統廠獲利的影響……………………50 4.13 R對於資訊對稱下設計廠商與系統廠決策的影響 ………………………50 4.14 R對於資訊對稱下設計廠商與系統廠獲利的影響 ………………………51 4.15 R對於資訊不對稱下設計廠商與系統廠決策的影響……………………51 4.16 R對於資訊不對稱下設計廠商與系統廠獲利的影響……………………52 4.17 p對於資訊不對稱下設計廠商獲利的影響…………………………………52 表目錄 2.1不對稱資訊類型………………………………………………………………10 3.1供應鏈各成員在各情境下之獲利表…………………………………………24 4.1 基本參數設定…………………………………………………………………39 4.2 參數設定下之決策與成本函數值……………………………………………40 4.3 資訊對稱下決策與獲利表……………………………………………………40 4.4 低良率系統廠之資訊不對稱下決策與獲利比較……………………………41 4.5 高良率系統廠之資訊不對稱下決策與獲利比較……………………………41 4.6 合理的參數範圍………………………………………………………………42

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