併購行為是公司重大決策之一，然而併購動機卻可能因為經理人以其私人利益作為考量做出對公司不利益之決策，產生代理成本。有鑑於諸多文獻探討以股權結構與公司治理的觀點降低代理問題，本文進一步探究股權結構與董事會職能對公司併購後營運綜效之影響。本文研究期間為2009年至2015年，樣本取自台灣上市公司的併購交易案，共有252個觀察值，以多元回歸模型檢測變數與併購後公司績效之間可能存在的非線性關係。實證發現，併購後公司績效隨著內部人持股上升而先降後升且與獨立董事占比、董事會規模皆呈現負相關。本文進一步，依產業特性將樣本分群為傳統產業與電子產業，檢測產業特性是否影響研究結果，結果發現此二產業在股權結構對併購後公司績效的影響有顯著的差異，但在董事會職能的檢測上則大致相同。最後，將內部人持股，獨立出董事會持股、經理人持股與大股東持股三項，並分別檢測其與併購後公司績效之關聯，發現併購後公司績效會隨董事會持股上升而先升後降、隨經理人持股上升而先降後升並與大股東持股呈顯著線性相關。

Mergers and acquisitions are kind of the important growth strategy in the company. However, some M&A decision would bring the bad influence due to the manager’s consideration for his private interests not for the company. Thus, this paper would discuss how to reduce the agency problem from the perspective of equity structure and corporate governance in the literature review. Then, we would further examine the impact of ownership structure and board functions on the synergy after the M&A event effective. This study selected 252 samples which acquiring companies were listed company in Taiwan from 2009 to 2015. Then, we employed the multiple regression method to examine the linear and nonlinear relation between the post-merger performance and the variables. This study found that the relation between post-merger firm performance and insider holding is U-shape. In addition, the larger size of the board of directors and the higher proportion of independent directors, the poor post-merger firm performance showed. Furthermore, we divided the insider holding into three parts - board holding, majority shareholder holding and manager holding to examine each influence to post-merger firm performance. The relation between firm performance for each part are converted U-shaped nonlinear relationship, positive (linear), U-shaped nonlinear relationship. Finally, we divided the sample into traditional industries and electronic industries and found that the influence of insider holding to post-merger firm performance is totally different from these two industries.

中文文獻
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王元章、張椿柏 (2011)。從核心代理問題的角度探討股權結構，董事會特性對公司價值之影響。 證券市場發展季刊,23(2), 131 - 174.

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陳玉麟 (2011)。外部創新多元性、吸收能力，與創新產出：以台灣 2000 年到 2004 年上 市公司為例。 臺大管理論叢, 22(1), 199-237.

陳美華、洪世炳 (2005)。公司治理、股權結構與公司績效關係之實證研究。 企業管理學報, 32, 129-153.

黃劭彥、鍾宇軒、吳東憲、廖上萱 (2009)。自願性財務預測、公司治理與權益資金成本。財務金融季刊, 10(2), 41-66.

葉銀華、蘇裕惠、柯承恩、李德冠 (2003)。公司治理機制對於關係人交易的影響。 證券市場發展季刊, 15(4), 69-106.

劉永欽、陳香如、陳聖雯 (2018)。經理人持股對公司價值的影響：過度自信的角色。經濟研究, 54(2), 191-242.

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