| 研究生: |
翁鶯娟 Wong, Ying-Jiuan |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
購併宣告對產業內競爭對手公司股價影響
之研究—以台灣上市公司為例 Contagion and Competitive Intra-industry Effects of Acquisition Announcements |
| 指導教授: |
張紹基
Chang, Shao-Chi |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 企業管理學系碩士在職專班 Department of Business Administration (on the job class) |
| 論文出版年: | 2002 |
| 畢業學年度: | 90 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 52 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 競爭效果 、事件研究法 、異常報酬 、蔓延效果 、購併 、競爭對手 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Contagion Effect, Event Study, Competitive Effect, Rivals, Abnormal Return, Acquisitions |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:180 下載:3 |
| 分享至: |
| 查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報 |
摘 要
本文主要研究蔓延效果及競爭效果在購併宣告中對產業中競爭對手公司股東財富的影響,本研究實證結果發現主併公司及其對手公司之累積異常報酬在購併宣告的前後一天(-1,+1)均為顯著性的負異常報酬,主併公司為-1.153%,產業中對手公司的累積異常報酬為-0.706%。在本研究中主併公司與對手公司之股價於宣告日前後一天股價同時反應向下,表蔓延效果在購併宣告事件中支配了競爭效果。
進一步研究產業競爭程度與財務槓桿高低對產業中對手公司異常報酬的影響的結果顯示,對手公司之異常報酬在Herfindal Index低的產業較Herfindal Index高的產業為低;對手公司的異常報酬在高財務槓桿產業亦較低財務槓桿產業為低。如分析財務槓桿與競爭程度的交互作用可發現高財務槓桿低Herfindal Index產業對手公司之異常報酬最低,低財務槓桿高Herfindal Index對手公司之異常報酬最高,此結果與Lang and Stulz (1992)結論一致:具高財務槓桿產業因應競爭挑戰的能力較差;具高競爭產業的對手公司無法從其他產業中對手公司需求移轉而獲益,故當購併宣告為一負面訊息時,高槓桿及高競爭程度的產業受蔓延效果的影響最大。
橫斷面分析結果亦顯示,對手公司之營運特徵如與主併公司相似的程度越高,則對手公司受宣告事件影響的程度會越高;另對手公司以往經營績效越差及Herfindal Index 對財務槓桿的比率越低,均會使對手公司之異常報酬越低。
ABSTRACT
Previous studies about the announcement of acquisitions often focus on the rivals of target firms. Differently, this research aims to investigate the effect of acquisition announcements on the value of announcing firm’s competitors. This study examines how intra-industry stock price corresponded to the acquisition announcement of publicly listed companies of Taiwan from 1989 to 2001.
We find that the valuation effects of the announcing firms and their industry rivals are both negative and significant. This result suggests that the contagion effect dominates the competitive effect when the acquisition announcements are declared. Consistent with contagion effect, negative cumulative abnormal return is significantly larger for the industries with high leverage and low competition. Whereas the competitive effect is dominant in industries where leverage and the degree of competition are low.
Cross-sectional results also indicate that the stock price effects are more unfavorable for rivals with stock returns that are highly correlated with the announcing firm’s stock returns, for rivals with poor prior performance, and with the lower ratio of Herfindal Index to leverage.
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