在會計穩健的影響下，壞消息年度盈餘與報酬的關係高於好消息年度。過去文獻亦指出盈餘與報酬關係較低時，會計盈餘對薪酬契約的重要性較高。因此，本研究以2006年至2008年台灣上市公司為研究對象，證實好消息年度高階經理人薪酬與盈餘之關係高於壞消息年度，因此穩健原則會影響會計盈餘對於薪酬契約的重要性。本研究亦進一步加入穩健程度較高之高科技產業的影響，證實穩健原則會影響高科技產業之會計盈餘對薪酬契約的重要性；此外，就壞消息年度而言，高科技產業之薪酬契約對會計盈餘的重視程度低於非高科技產業。然而在盈餘管理方面，本研究無法證實穩健原則是否影響高階經理人在好壞消息年度之盈餘管理行為。

It has long been established that because of accounting conservatism, the contemporaneous correalation between returns and earnings is higher for bad news firm-year than good news firm-year. Meanwhile, prior analytical agency work suggests that the compensation role of accounting earnings is potentially greater when the contemporaneous correlation between earnings and returns is lower. Based on a sample of 1587 observations from Taiwan listed companies over the period 2006-2008, the empirical results presented in this study suggest that, consistent with the predicted impact of accounting conservatism, the compensation weight on earnings is stronger in good news firm-year than bad news firm-year. Consequently, compensation committees appear to take cognizance of the impact of accounting conservatism when awarding earnings-based compensation. After considering the impact of high-tech firms with higher level of conservatism, we find that for high-tech firms, accounting conservatism would affect the importance of accounting earnings on compensation contract. In addition, for the aspect of bad news firm-year, CEO cash compensation exhibits different sensitivity to accounting earnings between high-tech and low-tech firms. However, we find no evidence suggest that CEO use more discretionary accruals to increase his cash compensation level in good news firm-year and bad-news firms-year.

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