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研究生: 趙尹萱
Chao, Yin-Hsuan
論文名稱: CEO減薪對投資者認知盈餘品質之影響
Investor perceptions of the earnings quality consequences of CEO paycuts
指導教授: 周庭楷
Chou, Ting-Kai
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 會計學系
Department of Accountancy
論文出版年: 2018
畢業學年度: 106
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 21
中文關鍵詞: 管理階層薪酬減薪盈餘反應係數
外文關鍵詞: executive compensation, pay cut, earnings response coefficient
相關次數: 點閱:103下載:20
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  • 公司績效表現不佳可能導致董事會選擇以大幅減薪之方式懲罰CEO,但減薪後績效迴轉卻可能是盈餘操縱,本研究探討市場上投資人對於CEO減薪是否會改變其所認知盈餘品質。樣本期間為1994年至2014年,將有減薪公司視為實驗組,且使用傾向分數配對選出沒有減薪公司視為控制組,利用差異中差異將兩個組別進行比較CEO減薪後之盈餘反應係數,結果發現有減薪公司之盈餘反應係數下降程度較強,代表投資人對於CEO減薪後公司所認知盈餘品質產生擔憂。此外,CEO減薪對於投資人認知盈餘品質之擔憂僅發生在外部監督較弱之公司,因此在外部監督能力較弱之公司,CEO減薪更可能會導致公司價值受損之結果。

    Boards sometimes cut a CEO’s pay following poor performance. However, regarding performance improvement following CEO paycuts, CEOs are likely to engage in earnings management. This study examines whether investor perceptions of the earnings quality consequences of CEO paycuts change or not. We identify firms with CEO paycuts as the treatment group during the period 1994–2014. We then create a propensity-score-matched control group of firms that did not cut their CEOs’ pay and employ a difference-in-differences approach to examine the consequences. Empirical results show that the earnings response coefficient (ERC) declines following CEO paycuts. Investors doubt earnings surprise about firms with CEO paycuts. Further, we find that investor concerns about CEO paycuts only occur in firms with weak external supervision. Therefore, in firms with weak external supervision, CEO paycuts may result in the loss of firm value.

    第一章、前言            1 第二章、文獻探討及假說發展     3 第一節、文獻探討          3 第二節、假說發展          5 第三章、研究設計          6 第一節、樣本選取          6 第二節、傾向分數配對        7 第三節、模型設定與變數衡量     8 第四章、實證結果          11 第一節、基本資料統計分析      11 第二節、迴歸分析結果與說明     14 第五章、結論            18 參考文獻              19

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