本研究旨在探討獨立董事連任逾三屆對公司經營績效之影響。本文以2013年至 2023年台灣上市上櫃公司（排除金融保險業）為研究對象。公司績效分別採用Tobin’s Q與ROA作為衡量指標。實證結果顯示，獨立董事連任逾三屆與公司績效之間未呈現顯著關聯。後續以傾向分數配對法(Propensity Score Matching, PSM)進行穩健性檢定。
進一步考量台灣企業具有高度家族控制之特性，本研究納入家族企業變數進行額外測試，以檢驗所有權結構是否會影響獨立董事連任逾三屆與公司績效之關係。實證結果顯示，家族企業情境下，獨立董事連任逾三屆對市場評價與會計績效呈現不同影響。在Tobin’s Q模型中，交乘項呈現顯著正向，表示市場可能正面看待家族企業中連任逾三屆之獨立董事所扮演的角色。然而，在ROA模型中，雖然獨立董事連任逾三屆於非家族企業中呈現顯著正向影響，但此效果在家族企業中有所減弱，顯示其對內部經營績效可能因所有權結構不同而有所差異。
綜上所述，本研究顯示獨立董事長期連任對公司績效之影響具有所有權結構差異，家族控制情境可能影響其治理功能之發揮。本研究結果可作為未來檢視獨立董事任期規範與公司治理制度設計之參考。

This study examines the impact of independent directors serving more than three consecutive terms on firm performance. The sample consists of TWSE-listed and TPEx-listed companies over the period 2013–2023, excluding firms in the financial industry. Firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. The independent variable is a dummy variable, OverThreeTerms, which equals one if a firm has at least one independent director serving more than three consecutive terms (i.e., more than nine years), and zero otherwise.
Considering that many Taiwanese firms are highly family-controlled, the effect of long-tenured independent directors may vary across ownership structures. Therefore, this study further incorporates a family firm variable for additional analysis. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is employed for estimation, and propensity score matching (PSM) is conducted as a robustness check.
The results indicate that (1) in the full sample, OverThreeTerms is not significantly associated with firm performance; (2) in the Tobin’s Q model, the interaction term with family firms is significantly positive, suggesting higher market valuation in family firms; and (3) in the ROA model, OverThreeTerms is significantly positive in non-family firms, whereas the effect is weakened in family firms.
In conclusion, the findings suggest that the impact of long-tenured independent directors on firm performance differs across ownership structures and that family control may influence the effectiveness of independent directors’ governance function. The results provide a reference for future evaluations of independent director tenure regulations and corporate governance design.

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