本研究基於臺灣證券交易所於2018年新增修訂揭露「非擔任主管職務之全時員工薪資資訊」之相關規定，分別以2018年及2019年至2022年之上市櫃公司為樣本，探討薪酬比率對公司績效及公司價值之影響。以過往文獻進行延伸探討，不僅研究高管員工薪酬差距及高薪酬誘因，更強調董監員工薪酬比率的影響力及意涵。實證結果顯示，高管員工薪酬比率越高之上市櫃公司，公司績效及公司價值越佳。這代表薪酬差距會提供誘因，激勵管理者盡最大努力，也能激發員工之間的良性競爭，進而對公司有正向影響。此外，本研究亦發現董監員工薪酬比與公司績效及公司價值呈正相關，代表給予較高的薪酬更能吸引高階人才擔任董事，提升公司的策略及營運效果，進而提高公司績效及公司價值。

This study investigates whether the pay ratios are associated with firm performance and firm value. I not only examine manager-to-employee pay ratios, but also highlight the significance of director-to-employee pay ratios. Extant prior research based on regulation about the mandatory disclosure compensation in Taiwan, I use two groups of firm-year observations: the mean employee compensation sample from 2018 to 2022 and the median employee compensation sample from 2019 to 2022. I find significant and positive association between pay ratios and ROA, ROE, and natural log of market value (MKT), but no significant association with Tobin’s Q (TBQ). These findings suggest that greater pay disparity can motivate managers to enhance their performance and encourage positive competition among employees, without leading to feelings of income unfairness, as compensation decisions are perceived as fair reflections of an individual's skills and efforts. The results also indicate that high director-to-employee pay ratio can attract and retain top talent within the firm, improve strategy, enhance operational efficiency, and ultimately maximize the firm performance and firm value.

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