許多文獻已經探討了執行長之權益薪酬的比例與公司之盈餘管理之間的關係，大部份的文獻指出其關係為正向，亦即當執行長持有較高比例之權益薪酬時，執行長較傾向於操弄盈餘，然而，仍有少數的文獻指出，其關係為顯著負相關或者是無法證實之間的關係。此篇研究以Hansen（1999）之單門檻模型為依據，延伸Hansen之單門檻模型為雙門檻模型，並以執行長之權益薪酬和BM比率為門檻變數，探討執行長之權益薪酬的比例與公司之盈餘管理之間的不對稱關係。實證結果顯示，若執行長目前權益薪酬的比率高於最適比率（亦即門檻值），則執行長會傾向於操弄盈餘，特別是當公司的成長機會較小時（亦即BM比率較大時）。

Previous studies have discussed the relationship between CEO’s equity-based compensation and earnings management. Most of them showed a positive relationship but some are not. Following Hansen’s (1999) methodology, use the single threshold model to examine the relationship between CEO’s equity-based compensation and the discretional accruals which is a proxy of earnings management. Beside we extend the single threshold model into the double threshold model. Our empirical results show that CEOs with higher proportion of equity-based compensation are prone to do earnings management, especially for firms in the lower growth potential.

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