政治投資是企業開拓政商網路的途徑之一，在政治投資標的中，以政治獻金尤具利益效果。近年來政府對民間團體、私人獎補助預算規模已超逾500億餘元，且逐年上升，企業或利益團體政治獻金捐款是否影響政府獎補助資源分配，這個問題令人感到好奇。本研究以2011年至2014年臺灣上市、上櫃及興櫃公司為研究樣本，分別由政治獻金捐款行為、捐款金額多寡及捐款對象等面向，深入探討企業從事政治捐獻對於其獲得政府補助款是否具有顯著影響。研究結果發現，無論企業有無從事政治獻金捐款、捐款金額多寡及捐款對象為何，對於其獲得政府補助資源的影響均有限，且呈現負向關係。此外，政府補助受惠對象仍以較具規模或特定產業之公司為主，而研發支出投入多寡反而未能直接反應於補助款。其次，政府補助款在選舉前後年度均較選舉當年顯著成長，說明執政者在選前為謀取連任機會、選後為兌現競選支票，會透過各種政策工具的操縱，以滿足或回饋選民。

Political investment is one of the approaches used by enterprises to develop state-business networks. Among political investment targets, political donations are the most cost-effective form of investment. In recent years, government grants to the private sector and individuals have surpassed NTD 50 billion, and the total continues to rise year-on-year. This begs the question of whether or not political donations from enterprises or interest groups affect governments’ allocation of grants. Using Taiwan-based listed, over-the-counter (OTC), and emerging companies which made political donations and received government grants between 2011 and 2014 as research samples, this study examines if enterprises’ political donations have a significant influence on their receiving government grants, by probing into the aspects of the making of donations, the amount, and the receivers of political donations. It is discovered that the making, the amount, and the receivers of political donations have a limited influence on enterprises’ receiving government grants; in fact, a negative correlation is indicated. Besides, beneficiaries of government grants are still mostly companies from well-established or specific industries, and the amount of their research and development expenditures does not directly reflect the grants they receive. Moreover, the amount of government grants increased significantly a year before and after an election year, showing that in seeking reelection and fulfilling campaign promises, the ruling party would manipulate all sorts of policy tools to satisfy or reward the electorate.

壹、中文部分
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