併購及策略聯盟為公司擴張常用的策略工具，兩者都藉由獲取外部資源以擴大公司的市場力量，因而被學者及企業視為替代選項，進行比較及選擇。本研究以訊號經濟學切入合併策略選擇，過往文獻發現新創公司為目標公司時，其IPO訊號能傳遞公司價值，影響焦點公司選擇併購或策略聯盟。

由於主併公司進行併購的機會成本較高，在資訊不對稱的狀況下，會偏好先以聯盟獲取被併公司資訊，使得主併公司偏好選擇聯盟更勝於併購。本研究探討這些訊號是否能充分揭露被併公司資訊，提升主併公司進行併購的機會。先前研究侷限於新創市場環境，本研究則拓展至上市公司，以短期負債占總負債之比率、每股股息、市場行為數量和有聲譽的高階管理者數量做為訊號。

本研究從SDC資料庫篩選出212筆自2013年至2018年的美國上市公司併購及聯盟資料做為應變數，並從Compustat及Lexis資料庫整理短期負債占總負債之比率、每股股息、市場行為數量和有聲譽的高階管理者數量，蒐集上述獨立變數在事件發生三年前、兩年前、一年前之數據。

本研究實證結果顯示，目標公司的市場行為數量及有聲譽的高階管理者數量越高，則焦點公司選擇併購而非策略聯盟的機率就越高，短期負債占總負債之比率及每股股息則無顯著影響。於學術貢獻上，本研究將新的訊號應用於上市公司之合併選擇，補足此研究領域之缺口。從實務面來看，本研究反映公司進行併購時的考量，發現管理訊號呈現公司未來成長潛力，其重要性遠高於財務訊號呈現的財務體質穩健性，藉此做為企業在合併選擇或營運的參考。

SUMMARY
Our study aims to investigate how focal firms make decisions between alliances and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by using target firm qualities as signals. We select firm debts, cash dividends, market actions, and top management team as the target firm's signals, and collected 212 samples from U.S listed companies that conducted alliances and/or M&As during 2013 to 2018.
The results of regression analysis show that the number of firm actions and the number of prestigious top managers are positively related to the choice of M&As over alliances by focal firms. The ratio of short-term debt to total debt and cash dividends payment are not significantly related to the focal firm's choice between M&As and alliances.

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