由於上市公司所有權分散，長久以來，主理人與代理人之間的代理問題，一直頗受爭議。亦即，公司若要由所有投資人一起經營，不但意見容易分歧，也會造成實務上之困難，因此公司一方面需要選派專業經理人負責經營，透過協調、計劃與部門整合，使企業得以獲得優良的營運績效;但另一方面，又唯恐經理人持股過高，產生違背股東利益之行為。另外，在知識經濟時代中，專業經營不僅包括管理議題，也包含創新議題，比如研發活動(R&D)常是評估科技產業經營績效的一項指標。還有，因為家族企業的經營通常較為保守，易偏袒家族成員的決策，因此，家族企業亦是專業管理的一項重要議題。
本研究資料來自台灣經濟新報232家上市公司，研究期間為2004-2008年，並以家族/非家族企業為干擾變數，分析專業經營度、研發度與經營績效的關係。研究結果顯示，經營績效家族/非家族企業的介入，會顯著改變研發與企業經營績效關係，這現象在高科技產業尤其明顯，顯示可能因為家族企業的專業經營度較低，投入較少的研發活動，使得企業經營績效也相對較低。

Agency problem between shareholders and managers has been a controversial issue on account of dispersed ownership. That is, the condition that a corporation is run by all shareholders will generate not only divergent opinions but also practical difficulties. Accordingly, a corporation needs to assign managers to run its business, through coordinating, planning and integrating with all business units, in order to achieve good operating performance. On the other hand, a corporation may be concerned about higher ownership by managers to infringe shareholders’ benefit. Besides, in the era of knowledge economy, professional management includes management issues, as well as innovation issues. For example, R&D is one of the indicators assessing the operating performance in info tech industry. In addition, because the more conservative operation of family firms easily favors the decision-making of the family members, family firm is also an important issue in professional management.
Research data is from Taiwan economic journal 232 public firms during 2004-2008. In particular, the research uses family/non-family firm as moderating variable to explore the relationship among R&D expense, manager’s ownership and firm performance. The result shows that manager ownership has positive effects on firm performance, while not in R&D expense. However, the interaction of manager ownership and R&D expense, and family/non-family firms moderating would change the effect given by R&D expense on firm performance. This phenomenon is especially significant in high-tech industry and could result from low professional management of family firm.

一、中文部分

1.牛延苓（2001）。股權結構、董事會組成與公司績效關係之研究－以高科技產業與傳統產業為例，中央大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
2.李馨蘋、詹凱玲（2007）。股權結構、董事會組成與公司績效之關係－以家族與非家族企業之角度，銘傳大學會計學系碩士論文。
3.侍台誠（1994）。董事會特性中家族因素與經營績效之實證研究－兼論法人董事的影響，台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
4.吳明儀（1997）。管理當局股權結構與盈餘管理相關性之研究，國立中興大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
5.柯承恩（2000a）。我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議（上），會計研究月刊，173，75-81。
6.柯承恩（2000b）。我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議（下），會計研究月刊，174，79-83。
7.許士軍、陳光中（1989）。台灣家族企業發展與家族結構關係，行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫成果報告。
8.陳泰和（2001）。台灣家族企業接班人選擇因素之研究：以交易成本、信賴機制、網絡關係、之觀點探討，國立台灣大學國際企業學所碩士論文。
9.陳耀東（2006）。產業全球化人力之佈局－甄選跨國專業經理條件之研究，銘傳大學國際事務研究所碩士學位論文。
10.張世佳（2002）。品質管理活動與產品彈性能力關係之實證研究－以主機板製造業為例，管理與系統，第九卷，第三期。
11.黃文勇（1997）。高科技公司研究發展績效評估之研究，國立彰化師範大學工業教育學系碩士論文。
12.黃勝平（2004）。負債、代理問題與審計公費關聯性之探討，政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
13.葉銀華（1998）。家族控股、董事會組成與經營績效－台灣家族企業管治機制之研究，行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫成果報告。
14.葉銀華（1999）。家族控股集團、核心企業與報酬互動之研究：台灣與香港證券市場之比較。管理評論，18（2），59-86。
15.葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩（2002）。公司治理與評等系統，商智文化出版社。
16.詹凱玲（2006）。股權結構、董事會組成與公司績效之關係－以家族與非家族企業之角度，銘傳大學會計學系研究所碩士論文。
17.楊幼梅（2002）。研究發展支出與未來股票報酬之關連性研究，中原大學會計研究所碩士論文。
18.楊開祥（2002）。研究發展投資抵減與企業績效關聯性之探討－以我國上市資訊電子業為例，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
19.榮泰生（2004）。管理學，三民書局。
20.謝淑娟（1994）。觀點探討股權結構與公司經營績效之關係－以台灣上市公司為實證，國立交通大學管理科學研究所碩士論文。

二、英文部分

1.Agrawal, A.（1990）. “Large Shareholders and the monitoring of managers: The case of antitakeover charter amendments,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 25(2):143-161.
2.Agrawal, A. & Mandelker, G. N.（1987）.“Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions,” Journal of Finance, Sep87, Vol. 42 Issue 4, p823-837, 15p
3.Aiken, L. S., & West, S.G.（1991）. “Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions ,” London: Sage
4.Alcorn, P. B.（1982）. “Success and Survival in the Family-Owned Business.” New York：McGraw-Hill Book Company.
5.Anderson, R. C., & D. M. Reeb（2003）. “Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500,” Journal of Finance 58（3）:1301-1328.
6.Andres Christian.（2008）. “Large shareholders and firm performance－an empirical examination of founding-family ownership” Journal of Corporate Finance, Sep2008, Vol. 14 Issue 4, p431-445, 15p
7.Barnes, Louis B. & Simon A. Hershon（1976）. “Transferring Power in the Family Business,” Harvard Business Review, 105-114.
8.Barth, E., T. Gulbrandsen, & P. Schone,（2005）. “Family Ownership and Productivity: the Role of Owner-Management,” Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.11, pp. 107– 127.
9.Bartlett, C. A. & S. Ghoshal（1986）. “Tap your subsidiaries for global reach,” Harvard Business Review, 64（6), pp. 87-94.
10.Bergen, M., S. Dutta, & O. Walker（1992）. “Agency Relationships in Marketing: A Reviewof the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related Theories,” Journal of Marketing, 56（3）, pp. 1-24.
11.Berle, A., & Means（1932）. “The Modern Corporate and Private Property: A Reappraisal/Comment/Hessen’s Reappraisal,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 273-299（1983）.
12.Branch B.（1974）. “Research-and-Development Activity and profitability：A Distributed Lag Analysis”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.82, Iss.5, 999-1011.
13.Burkart, Panunzi & Shleifer（2002）. “Family Firm,” Discussion Paper 1944, Harvard Institute of Economic Research.
14.Burkart, M., F. Panunzi, & A. Shleifer.（2002）. “Family firms,”Working paper 8776,National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, USA.
15.Byrd, Parrino, Pritsch（1998）. “ Stockholder-manager conflicts and firm value,” Financial Analyst Journal, AIMR.
16.Chandler, W. G.（1977）. “Managing Human Resources,（5th ed）” Cleveland, J. N.: McGraw-Hill.
17.Chauvin, Keith W. & Hirschey, Mark.（1993）.“Advertising, R&D expenditures and the market value of the firm,” The Journal of the Financial Management Association, Winter1993, Vol. 22 Issue 4, p128, 13p, 3 Charts
18.Coleman, J. S.（1990）. “Foundations of Social Theory,” The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
19.Dollinger, M. J.（1984）. “ Environmental boundary spanning and information processing effects on organizational performance,” Academy of Management Journal, 27（3）, pp.351-368.
20.Dyer, & W. Gibb（2006）. “Examining the Family Effect on Firm Performance,” Family Business Review, 19(4), pp. 253-273
21.Goffee, R. & R. Scase（1985）. “Proprietorial Control in Family Firms: Some Functions of Quasi-Organic Management Systems,” Journal of Management, Vol. 22, pp. 53–68.
22.Gomez-Mejia, L. R., M. Nunez-Nickel, & I. Gutierrez（2001）. “The role of family this in agency contracts,” Academy of Management Journal 44（1）: 81-95.
23.Hofer, C. W. & R. Charan（1984）. “The Transition to Professional Management: Mission Impossible?” Family Business Sourcebook, Omni graphics, Detroit.
24.Jensen, M. C., & R. Ruback（1983）. “The market for corporate control：the scientific evidence,”Journal of Financial Economics 11, 5-50.
25.Jensen, Michael C., & William H. Meckling（1976）. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, ” Journal of Financial Economics 3,305-360.
26.Leland, H. E., & Pyle D. H.（1977）. “Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation,” Journal of Finance, May77, Vol. 32 Issue 2, p371-387
27.Lev, B., & Sougiannis, T.（1996）.“The capitalization, amortization, and value-relevance of R&D,” Journal of Accounting & Economics, 21（1）,107-138.
28.Maury, B.（2006）. “Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from Western European Corporations,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 12, pp.321–341.
29.McCall Jr., Morgan W., Hollenbeck, & George P..（2002）“Global fatalities” Ivey Business Journal, May/Jun2002, Vol. 66 Issue 5, p74, 5p
30.Mehran, hamid（1995）.“Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance,” Journal of Financial Economics, Jun95, Vol. 38 Issue 2, p163-184, 22p
31.Morbey, G. K.（1989）. “R&D: Its Relationship to Company Performance,”Journal of Product Innovation Management.5（3）,pp191-200.
32.Morbey, G. K. and Reithner R. M.（1990）.“How R&D Affects SalesGrowth ,　Productivity and Profitability,” Research Technology Management, May-June 1990, pp.11-14.
33.Morck, R., A. SHLEIFER, & R. W. VISHNY.（1988）. “Management Ownership and Market Valuation.” Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315.
34.Nelson Richard R.（1982）.“The role of knowledge in R&D efficiency,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Aug82, Vol. 97 Issue 3, p453-470, 18p
35.Paper, Chung R., M. Firth & J. B. Kim.（2002）.“Institutional Monitoring and Opportunistic Earnings Management,” Journal of Corporate Finance 8, 29-48
36.Pollack, R. A.（1985）. “A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households,”Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 581–608.
37.Porter, Michael E.（1992）. “Capital disadvantage: America's failing capital investment system,”Harvard Business Review 70, 65-82.
38.Pound, John（1988）.“Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight,” Journal of Financial Economics, Jan-Mar88, Vol. 20 Issue 1/2, p237-265, 29p
39.Rajgopal, S. & M. Venkatachalam.（1998）. “The Role of Institutional Investors In Corporate Governance：An Empirical Investigation,” Working
40.Scherer, F. M. & D. Ross（1990）.“Industrial market structure and economic performance,” Bosto, Houghton Mifflin p.279~299（1965）
41.Stulz, R. M.（1988）. “Management control of voting right: Financing policies and the market for corporate control,” Journal of Financial Economics 20: 431-460.
42.Tomaz, & Ranijel （2005）. “How competitive advantage influences firm performance: The case of slovenian firms,” Economic and Business Review, 2005, Vol.7, No.2, P119~135
43.Yeh, Y. H., T. S. Leey, & T. Woidtkez（2001）. “Family Control and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Taiwan,” International Review of Finance, 2:1/2, 2001: pp. 21-48
44.Handler Wendy C.（1990）“Succession in family firms: a mutual role adjustment between entrepreneur and next-generation family members,” Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, Fall90, Vol. 15 Issue 1, p37-51, 15p, 2 Charts