本篇論文的主要目的在於探討在美國NASDAQ掛牌高科技公司的內部人薪酬結構與公司治理的關係。之前的研究主要集中在探討股權分散的大公司,其內部人薪酬結構和公司治理間的影響，但是較少人探討股權集中的小公司之公司治理。而大部分的高科技公司雖然規模較小，但是對整個世界的經濟卻有舉足輕重的影響力。高科技公司具有其特殊的公司治理結構，例如小規模的董事會、CEO具有公司的創立者(Founder)的身份、內部人持有很高的股權比例等等。這些特性將如何影響內部人薪酬是我們欲探討的部分。因此，我們得出以下結論:當CEO具有創立者的身份時會趨向保守而必須給予較多的誘因薪酬。另外，當CEO在位較久時，傾向收到較多的現金薪酬而較少的誘因薪酬，因為他們對於風險的忍受度降低。除此之外，高科技公司使用績效導向的薪酬結果十分明顯，而CEO持股比例的變動對誘因薪酬及總薪酬的變動有顯著的負向關係。我們也更進一步發現到，CEO 的持股每上升1%，其選擇權薪酬和總薪酬分別會下降0.291%和0.9906元。

　　This study aims to examine the relationship between insider compensation and corporate governance in high-tech firms listed in NASDAQ. Contrary from most literatures focusing on the topics of corporate governance for large and diversely-owned firms, we empirically analyze the governance of small and ownership-concentrated companies. The high-tech firms have distinct governance features, such as small board size, founder CEO, and large shareholding of insiders. We investigate the impacts of these governance factors on the compensation to CEO and to executive directors. The evidence shows that CEOs who are founders will become more conservative and hence receive more incentive pay in high-tech firms. The entrenchment problem will occur when a CEO has long tenure because he will receive more cash pay and less option compensation. We further conclude that pay-for-performance is commonly observed in high-tech firms. The change of CEO ownership is negatively related to the change of CEO option compensation and total compensation. Furthermore, when CEO ownership increases 1%, his option compensation and total compensation will decrease 0.291% and $0.9906 respectively.

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