本篇研究旨在探討國際化程度與降低代理成本機制之間的關係，這些機制包括了管理者持股比例，負債比例與股利發放程度。透過實證研究，我們希望能夠了解當國際化程度增加時，企業將如何制定這些財務政策來面對較高的代理成本。除此之外，由於過去文獻探討這三個財務政策之間關係的結果並不一致，透過三階段回歸最小平方法 (3SLS)，本篇研究希望持續探討三者之間的相互關係。利用台灣電子業上市公司作為觀察樣本，我們發現管理者持股所扮演的誘因機制對於控制國際企業較高的代理成本是相當重要的，換句話說，當企業的國際化程度增加時，最有效的降低代理成本的方法即為集中的擁有權。然而，本篇實證結果在國際化程度對於負債與股利政策的影響並不顯著。至於控制代理成本的財務政策之間的相互依賴關係，我們發現企業確實會在股利發放與固定財務支出之間作權衡，來降低代理成本。為了避免未來資金不足的問題或是因過度使用負債或股利而產生的成本，負債比率高的企業會選擇持有保留盈餘，而不是將之轉成股利發給股東。

This study is concerned with the relationships between the degree of internationalization and the mechanisms used to reduce agency costs. These mechanisms include debt financing, managerial ownership and dividend payouts. Empirical tests are conducted to see how these financial policies change when the degree of internationalization of a firm increases. Additionally, another goal of this study is to examine the interrelationships among debt, managerial ownership and dividend payouts by the method of 3 stage least squares, because there is discrepancy in the interrelationships among these policies empirically examined by prior research. Using a sample of electronic firms in Taiwan, we find that the incentive mechanism provided by managerial ownership is crucial for controlling higher agency costs for MNCs (Multinationals). In other words, as the degree of internationalization of a firm increases, the most effective tool to reduce agency costs is concentrated ownership. However, the impact of internationalization on debt and dividend policies is not straightforward. As to the interdependence among the financial policies of firms, we find that firms really trade off dividend payments with fixed financial charges in order to reduce agency costs. For avoiding insufficiencies in the future, firms with high leverage ratios will hold their retained earnings rather than giving them out to the shareholders.

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