本研究之主要目的為研究公司若使用不同的權益融資，是否會創造出不同的公司現金價值。私募股權投資人對於發行公司的經營狀況較一般投資人更為瞭解，且這些投資人會更有動機去監督經營團隊的行為或提供經營團隊專業意見，因此能降低代理問題發生的可能性，進而增加公司現金價值。本研究實證結果發現，在私募股權下所持有的現金價值顯著高於公開發行股權下持有的現金價值，此結果說明現金價值會因為私募的監督效果或確認效果而提升；在帶入代理問題的相關變數後，結果說明公開發行的企業若提高內部監督時能明顯提高現金價值，亦說明目前公開發行的企業的內部監督程度較為不足；反之，私募並沒有因為內部監督的增加而明顯改善現金價值。

This paper examines whether the valuation impact of equity financing for cash saving is different for public offerings and private placements. The investors of private placements are able to access more inside information, are more capable to participate in the investment decisions of the firms, and have a larger monitoring incentive to increase firm value than outside investors. We find that the value of cash accumulated from equity issuance with private placements is significantly higher than that from public offerings, indicating that the value of cash holding may increase due to monitoring effects or certification effects. In addition, we find that firms create greater value of cash holdings by public offerings when they increase the degree of internal monitoring. In contrast, the value of cash holdings by private placement is not improved when firms increase the internal monitoring.

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