本研究旨在探討當董事長兼具公司員工性質之職務而取得員工認股選擇權時，其是否會較傾向於將員工認股選擇權(ESO)安排在公司股價下降時做發放，而於激勵員工的同時以增加其所獲取之員工認股選擇權的價值；於此，本研究並進而探究此現象所代表的公司治理實務。以2001~2004年間之85家電子資訊產業上市公司210個認股選擇權為樣本，本文以實證證明當董事長有權對員工認股選擇權發放日作決定而其又取得員工認股選擇權時，員工認股選擇權發放日前公司股價確實會因為壞消息的季盈餘宣告而呈現顯著下降的趨勢，顯見此時董事長將較傾向於將員工認股選擇權發放日安排在公司股價下降之時。再者，由公司治理的角度切入，公司給予有權對員工認股選擇權發放日做決定之董事長員工認股選擇權，實證結果並未顯現出其公司治理實務的好壞。

　This paper investigates the timing of employee stock option (ESO) awards, as a method of investigating corporate board chairs’ influence over the terms of their own compensation. In a sample of 210 employee stock option awards of 85 Taiwan Stock Exchange listing companies in electronic industry between 2001 and 2004, the empirical results find that the timing of awards coincides with decreases in the firm’s stock price relate to the arrival of bad news occur before the award date. This paper documents changes in share prices around award date and quarterly earnings announcements. Patterns of companies’ quarterly earnings announcements are consistent with an interpretation that employee stock options award shortly after the release of unfavorable corporate news. These findings suggest that when board chairs have the discretion to time employee stock option award date and serve as corporate employees granted employee stock options at the same time, they are more inclined to make opportunistic award decisions that motivate employees and maximize their stock option compensation meanwhile .

　From the point of corporate governance, for the situation that board chairs have the discretion to time employee stock option award date and serve as corporate employees granted employee stock options concurrently, this paper moreover investigates whether this situation is a poor corporate governance. In the empirical results, there is no obvious evidence that whether or not making the board chairs have the discretion to time employee stock option award date and serve as corporate employees granted employee stock options at the same time is a poor practice of corporate governance.

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